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WILL SWING PRICING SAVE SEDENTARY 
SHAREHOLDERS? 
Anne M. Tucker & Holly van den Toorn* 
This Article explains and explores new Securities Exchange 
Commission rules authorizing optional swing pricing for mu-
tual funds. Swing pricing is an anti-dilution tool intended to 
protect sedentary investors who enter, and stay, in a fund. 
Workers setting aside money for retirement are often sedentary 
investors. Mutual funds are the mainstay vehicle for retire-
ment investors, yet as sedentary shareholders they can experi-
ence significant asset dilution over their savings lifetime. 
Swing pricing—a mutual fund pricing mechanism that allo-
cates transaction costs to the triggering shareholders—could 
save sedentary shareholders, collectively, billions of dollars.  
The mutual fund industry’s operational complexities and 
competing regulatory obligations may prevent funds from im-
mediately utilizing swing pricing once it becomes effective in 
November 2018. The biggest obstacle is a time conflict reminis-
cent of the chicken and egg problem. Under current industry 
operations, mutual funds will not receive the trading infor-
mation necessary to adjust the daily price of the fund (swing 
the price) until after funds have to finalize the price adjust-
ment. Blockchain technology—offering secure, automated, and 
verified ledgers—may present an operational path forward for 
the industry. 
The SEC’s swing pricing approach leaves unanswered how 
funds will overcome these, and other, hurdles. This Article ex-
plores the components of swing pricing, as well as the objec-
tions to and perceived benefits of swing pricing, and concludes 
with two unique perspectives on the SEC rules: one academic 
 
* Anne M. Tucker, Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State Univer-
sity College of Law. Holly van den Toorn has over eighteen years of mutual 
fund industry experience and is currently a Legal and Compliance Manager 
for a publically traded company, its wholly-owned registered investment ad-
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student and expects to complete her J.D. in May 2019. 
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and one professional. This Article maintains that mutual 
funds should take on the challenge of implementing swing 
pricing, and that market incentives will pave the way. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most of us envision our sunset years involving less work, 
more leisure, and maybe even a warmer climate. Retirement 
requires saving today for tomorrow’s time off. The way that 
most working Americans save for retirement is through mu-
tual funds available through an employer-sponsored plan or 
an individual retirement account. Retirement savings fueled 
mutual fund growth with combined assets of $18.9 trillion at 
year-end 2016.1 Retirement investors—meaning any worker 
of any age setting aside some of their paycheck for retirement 
savings—are encouraged to set an automated contribution at 
the time of employment and pick their funds (i.e., allocate 
their assets). Once set, many retirement investors do not 
change their initial asset allocation but instead stay in the 
same fund, earning them the label “sedentary.”2 Consider that 
 
1 INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 10–11 (2017), 
https://www.icifactbook.org/deployedfiles/FactBook/Site%20Properties/pdf/ 
2017/2017_factbook.pdf [perma.cc/8NLB-NJHT] (noting that households 
make up the largest group of mutual fund investors and that registered in-
vestment companies managed twenty-two percent of household financial as-
sets, a significantly increased figure over the last several decades due to the 
change in retirement saving structures). 
2 Retirement investors often unwittingly violate financial planning 
rules, but they do tend to adhere to one rule: they are long-term investors. 
Rebalancing asset allocations within an account, reviewing plan options for 
low-fee investments, and updating asset allocations to reflect shifting risk 
tolerance/profiles consistent with an investor’s retirement age are just a few 
of the financial planning best practices violated by the ‘set it and forget it’ 
model. For a discussion of common investor mistakes, see FED. RESEARCH 
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just over 5% of retirement investors changed their investment 
choices in 2016, meaning that 95% did not.3 
There may be a hidden cost to setting investments and for-
getting about them. Long-term, sedentary shareholders who 
stay in a fund may be subsidizing the activity of other inves-
tors who are entering or exiting the fund. The subsidy paid by 
sedentary investors, if incurred, is relatively little—a fraction 
of transaction costs each day. The fractional costs com-
pounded over thirty years and aggregated across the retire-
ment system, however, pose significant costs in absolute 
terms: estimates range from $10–17 billion annually. The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) swing pricing 
rules target this slow leak of retirement savings, known as as-
set dilution. 
In October 2016, the SEC adopted the Liquidity Rules.4 As 
a part of the new rules—to be effective in November 2018—
 
DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG., BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS AND PITFALLS OF U.S. INVES-
TORS 7–14 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/investor/locinvestorbehaviorre-
port.pdf [perma.cc/U3LQ-RXFD] (discussing investor mistakes). See also 
Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly 
Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 
620–26 (2014) (summarizing literature on investor mistakes). 
3 For evidence of investors’ preference to set investment accounts and 
then forget them, consider 2016 data collected by the Investment Company 
Institute (the “ICI”) from twenty-nine million employer-based defined con-
tribution retirement accounts, which shows that only 5.6% of participations 
changed the asset allocation of their contributions and 9.4% rebalanced 
their existing allocations. SARAH HOLDEN & DANIEL SCHRASS, INV. CO. INST., 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN PARTICIPANTS’ ACTIVITIES, 2016, at 5 (2017), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_16_rec_survey_q4.pdf [perma.cc/957U-H54L]. 
One exception to this observation is target date funds, where investors se-
lect the fund based on their target date of retirement. Because the fund re-
balances automatically each year and the asset allocation changes as the 
worker/saver approaches retirement age, investors are encouraged to leave 
their investment in that fund for the duration of their working/saving life. 
See, e,g., Investor Bulletin: Target Date Retirement Funds, SEC (May 1, 
2010), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/tdf.htm [perma.cc/4X3R-YTQP]. 
4 The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted the 
Liquidity Rules to combat liquidity costs, and other structural concerns re-
lated to the mutual fund industry. The Liquidity Rules also address open-
end funds’ liquidity risk management, derivatives, swing pricing, and pro-
pose to codify the fifteen percent illiquid securities guidelines. The rules 
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the SEC authorized optional partial swing pricing as a liquid-
ity tool to allocate transactional and other costs to the share-
holders generating the expenses when exiting or entering a 
fund.5 Allocating expenses to the entering or departing fund 
shareholders through swing pricing prevents dilution of exist-
ing shareholders’ investments. Swing pricing is facially a tech-
nical issue, but a scratch to the surface reveals it as a lens into 
key aspects of mutual fund investment—a practice 54.9 mil-
lion U.S. households engage in to the tune of $16.3 trillion.6 
This Article provides a technical, but accessible, review of 
swing pricing focusing on the theory, rules, benefits, chal-
lenges, and regulatory alternatives. Part II introduces readers 
to a key attribute of U.S. open-ended mutual funds—the daily 
Net Asset Value (“NAV”)—and explains the relationship be-
tween NAV and new SEC regulatory priorities of fund liquid-
 
were originally released on September 22, 2015 and were finalized in No-
vember 2016 with an effective date of January 1, 2018. Open-End Fund Li-
quidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Com-
ment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, 80 
Fed. Reg. 62274, 62283 (proposed Oct. 15, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 210, 270, 274) [hereinafter Swing Pricing First Proposal]. The SEC is-
sued final liquidity risk management rules in October 2016. Investment 
Company Liquidity Risk Management Programs, 81 Fed. Reg. 82142 (Nov. 
18, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274) [hereinafter Final Li-
quidity Risk Rules]. The SEC’s Liquidity Management Rule provides a 
framework for a fund to evaluate and manage its liquidity profile. Id. at 
82155. Funds will provide liquidity data to the SEC via Form N-PORT and 
N-CEN, including details about a fund’s liquidity risk management prac-
tices. Id. at 82193–97, 82222–23. The SEC’s stated goal with respect to the 
liquidity risk management rules is to ensure that funds can meet share-
holder redemptions and avoid shareholder investment dilution. Id. at 
82148–50, 82262. In order to encourage funds to proactively manage and 
reduce dilution, the SEC incorporated an additional anti-dilution tool in its 
release: swing pricing. Id. at 82262. The SEC established swing pricing 
guidelines in a separate release, which forms the basis of our discussion in 
this Article. See Investment Company Swing Pricing, 81 Fed. Reg. 82084 
(Nov. 18, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 270, 274) [hereinafter 
Final Rules]. 
5 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82084. 
6 INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 130; see also Holden, supra note 3, at 
2 (describing defined contribution plan asset trends from 2007–2016). 
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ity management and shareholders’ asset dilution. Part III ac-
quaints readers with swing pricing, connects the conversation 
with international initiatives, and provides a detailed exami-
nation of the new SEC swing pricing rules for U.S. mutual 
funds. Drawing from the public comments submitted to the 
SEC and industry sources, Part IV describes the anticipated 
benefits of the new rules and catalogues the operational and 
conceptual challenges impeding swing pricing implementa-
tion by mutual funds. Finally, Part V discusses existing tools 
to manage mutual fund liquidity and prevent shareholders’ 
asset dilution, and compares these options to swing pricing.  
Part VI first identifies the views on swing pricing shared 
by both authors of this Article, then proceeds to explicate each 
author’s individual perspective, including the benefits and ob-
stacles that lie ahead. Here these two voices, previously left to 
the footnotes, take center stage as this Article discusses the 
merit and challenges of swing pricing from two fundamentally 
different perspectives. The first contributes an industry, top-
down perspective that is practical and focused on implemen-
tation. The second provides a bottom-up perspective that em-
phasizes the role of mutual funds in our retirement system 
and praises the potential for a more level-playing field for exit-
constrained retirement investors who should not subsidize 
more sophisticated investors’ exits. Both authors agree on the 
relative merits of swing pricing and conclude that the SEC’s 
reliance on market solutions to resolve the considerable oper-
ational challenges is a shrewd but ultimately appropriate reg-
ulatory choice. 
 II. MUTUAL FUNDS, LIQUIDITY, AND DILUTION: 
A PRIMER 
“Cash is king,” as the old adage goes, applies to mutual 
fund investments. Liquidity refers to how quickly or easily a 
fund can convert an asset into cash.7 Liquidity is central to 
 
7 For a discussion of liquidity generally and as applied to mutual funds, 
see Conrad Ciccotello, The Nature of Mutual Funds, in MUTUAL FUNDS: 
PORTFOLIO STRUCTURES, ANALYSIS, MANAGEMENT, AND STEWARDSHIP 1, 5–7 
(John A. Haslem, ed., 2010). 
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mutual funds because fund shareholders have a right to re-
deem their fund shares in exchange for cash, calculated on the 
fund’s current NAV.8 Funds calculate their NAV daily. It is 
the price at which new investors buy into a fund and the price 
paid to redeeming shareholders when they exit the fund.  
Daily cash-out or cash-in prices (i.e., the NAV) and quick 
conversion of mutual fund stock to cash are defining features 
of open-ended mutual funds.9 Mutual funds are obligated to 
respond to a shareholder’s redemption and send cash proceeds 
to the shareholder within seven days of receiving an order to 
redeem.10 Every shareholder has a right to quickly cash out of 
a fund, making liquidity management a fundamental part of 
the portfolio manager’s job.11 NAV is a key component to un-
derstanding fund share dilution and exposing the connection 
between liquidity and dilution—the SEC’s regulatory aim of 
swing pricing rules. 
Here this Article takes a brief detour to familiarize readers 
with the regulatory landscape unique to mutual funds. Expert 
readers may wish to skip to Part III. Mutual funds sit at the 
legislative and administrative intersection of SEC authority 
 
8 Pricing of Redeemable Securities for Distribution, Redemption and 
Repurchase, 17 C.F.R § 270.22c-1 (2017). 
9 Inv. Co. Inst., Comment Letter on Open-End Fund Liquidity Manage-
ment Programs A-1 (Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Let-
ter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-54.pdf 
[perma.cc/E7RZ-5LP5]. Closed-end funds are traded in a manner similar to 
stocks—in an exchange facilitated competitive bidding process that deter-
mines the price as opposed to trading at NAV. Thus, a closed-end fund can 
trade at a premium or a discount to its NAV. For a discussion of closed-end 
mutual funds, see Closed-End Fund Information, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmfclosehtm.html 
[perma.cc/5C4N-H47T]. 
10 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62277 (describing 
quick cash conversion as a “hallmark” of open-end funds). Citations to the 
Proposed Rules are provided in this Article when the proposal contains a 
rich discussion of the concepts motivating the new rules, mutual fund prac-
tices, or provisions eliminated or differing from the final rules. 
11 Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9; see also Ciccotello, su-
pra note 7, at 6 (“[A]n open-end fund manager must not only select securi-
ties but also manages the portfolio with an eye toward Daily flow into and 
out of the fund.”). 
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under the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act of 1934, 
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, and the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.12 Maintaining its mandate to protect 
investors, the SEC released sweeping liquidity management 
rules and announced “evaluation of . . . investment advisers’ 
liquidity risk management practices” as an examination pri-
ority.13 Changes to the mutual fund industry drove this liquid-
ity regulation. According to research by the SEC’s Division of 
Economic and Risk Analysis (the “DERA”) from 2000–2014, 
mutual funds’ investments in less liquid asset classes grew 
significantly, with foreign bond and equity funds growing 
from 11% to 17.4% of total US mutual fund industry assets, 
 
12 Congress created the SEC to regulate the U.S. securities market 
with the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, and designed it “to restore investor confidence” in the markets. 
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2017)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-
291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2017)). See also 
What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
[perma.cc/Q3DK-W253]. In 1940, Congress again acted to pass the Invest-
ment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act in order to regulate com-
panies, including investment companies (commonly called mutual funds) 
and the investment advisers that manage mutual funds. See Investment 
Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2017)); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 
to 80b-21 (2017)). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 are two prime instances 
of legislation that stemmed from events significantly affecting the ever-
changing markets, and from which the SEC drew new regulations and over-
sight functions. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002); Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 
(2010). 
13 Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces 2016 Examination Priorities 
(Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-4.html 
[perma.cc/6QCJ-7UHF]. 
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as an example.14 In particular, alternative asset class15 mu-
tual fund strategies grew from total assets of $365 million in 
2005 to $334 billion in 2014—a faster rate than any other as-
set class.16 Alternative strategies typically experience more 
volatility when compared to mutual funds holding traditional 
asset classes,17 which equates to less liquidity. DERA’s empir-
ical results show that when an average equity fund experi-
ences an outflow, liquidity decreases.18 Significantly, a fund 
with fewer assets and less equities may experience a greater 
liquidity reduction.19  
The continued growth in mutual fund assets as a whole 
demonstrates investor reliance on funds to meet financial sav-
ings needs.20 Mutual funds’ importance to savings for individ-
ual and systemic financial stability, coupled with increased li-
quidity vulnerabilities in new fund types, prompted the SEC 
to propose a suite of liquidity risk management rules, includ-
ing a proposal on swing pricing.21  
 
14 Memorandum from Paul Hanoua et al., Div. of Econ. & Risk Analysis 
on Liquidity and Flows of U.S. Mutual Funds to Mark Flannery, Dir. & 
Chief Economist, Div. of Econ. & Risk Analysis 1 (Sept. 2015) [hereinafter 
SEC Liquidity Whitepaper], https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-
papers/liquidity-white-paper-09-2015.pdf [perma.cc/YJ4W-LAJ8]. 
15 The SEC eschews a singular definition of alternative mutual funds 
classifying the group by a primary investment strategy that falls into one of 
three categories: (1) non-traditional asset classes such as currencies or man-
aged futures, (2) non-traditional strategies such as long-short equities, or 
(3) less liquid investments such as private debt. Final Rules, supra note 4, 
at 82152 n.95. 
16 SEC Liquidity Whitepaper, supra note 14, at 1. 
17 Id. at 2. Traditional asset classes include publicly traded stocks and 
bonds such as U.S. Treasury Notes. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82119. 
21 See Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62278–81 (estab-
lishing a basis for SEC regulation of mutual funds). There is no comparable 
discussion in the Final Rules, supra note 4. Following the financial crisis in 
2008 when money market funds broke the buck, the SEC issued new money 
market fund regulations in 2010 and 2014 requiring a floating NAV and 
authorizing new liquidity tools—such as liquidity fees and redemption 
gates—to money market fund boards in order to curb outflows in a run. 
Tucker_VanDenToorn_Final  
No. 1:130]      WILL SWING PRICING SAVE SEDENTARY SHAREHOLDERS? 139 
Liquidity management is not a “one size fits all approach,” 
but a complex task requiring individually tailored tools .22 It 
is influenced by a broad range of factors, including (1) asset 
type, the asset’s available market (i.e., buyers and sellers), 
and settlement period; (2) available portfolio cash and the 
ability to borrow, such as via a credit facility; and (3) market 
conditions at the time of the transaction. The following discus-
sion provides an overview of liquidity, NAV, fund flows, and 
dilution, their connection to each other, and the market and 
regulatory choices that they invoke. 
A. Liquidity, Net Asset Value, and Fund Flows 
Trading volume—i.e., the amount of a particular security 
that is traded over a given period of time—is an essential ele-
ment in assessing the liquidity and price of a security.23 The 
 
Money Market Funds, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c) (2017); see also Press Release, 
SEC, SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reform Rules (July 23, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-143 [perma.cc/L46N-R8PZ] 
(describing the money market rules as addressing “risks of investor runs” 
while “preserving the benefits of the funds”). 
22 Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9, at A-3. 
23 See Daniel Fricke & Austin Gerig, Liquidity Risk, Speculative Trade, 
and the Optimal Latency of Financial Markets 3 (SEC, Div. of Econ. & Risk 
Analysis, Working Paper) (Dec. 1, 2014) https://www.sec.gov/files/dera-wp-
liquidity-risk.pdf [perma.cc/JBU7-D5H7] (noting three main factors affect-
ing liquidity including price volatility, “the number of public investors who 
trade the asset,” and correlated asset value).  
One author of this Article, Holly van den Toorn, has professional experience 
in the mutual fund industry and conducted interviews with other mutual 
fund professionals in her research for this Article. The responses received 
provide a unique perspective on swing pricing and insight into the mutual 
fund industry. While these professionals agreed to have their responses 
used for research, they asked to remain anonymous. As such, this Article 
cites to these interviews as follows: FaceTime Interview with Anonymous 
(Sept. 3, 2016) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter FaceTime Interview 
with Anonymous]. Holly van den Toorn also shares her professional experi-
ence, observations, and opinions in the footnotes. 
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higher the trading volume, the more liquid the security is per-
ceived to be.24 If a limited market exists for a security, pricing 
of that security will be highly sensitive to the number of bids 
(requests to buy) and asks (requests to sell) available for the 
security.25 The more bids and asks that exist for a particular 
security, the more liquid that security is perceived to be.26  
For example, IBM is a large capitalization company of 
$141.6 billion and heavily traded stock in January 2018.27 
IBM stock traded, on average, 4.3 million shares a day.28 
Large capitalization and frequent trading indicate a highly 
liquid stock. A portfolio manager wanting to buy or sell IBM 
stock could do so easily with “plenty of room for trading.”29 A 
portfolio manager interested in trading in IBM would look at 
the accumulated trades for that date: If the trading volume is 
significantly lower than average, it may signal reduced liquid-
ity and thereby influence the decision to sell (less risky in a 
tight market) or buy (more risky in a tight market).30  
Conversely, WD-40 is a small capitalization stock, with a 
market capitalization of only $1.78 billion31 and an average 
daily trading volume of 55,538 shares in January 2018.32 
Given its relatively low trading volume, a fund holding WD-
 
24 “Liquidity, therefore, is affected by market participation, and we 
should expect liquidity to increase with market size.” Fricke & Gerig, supra 
note 23, at 1. 
25 FaceTime Interview with Anonymous, supra note 23; see also ROB-
ERT C. POZEN, THE MUTUAL FUND BUSINESS 215–18 (1998). 
26 FaceTime Interview with Anonymous, supra note 23. 
27 See International Business Machines Corporation Common Stock & 
Summary Data, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/ibm  (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2018). 
28 Id. (generating a ninety-day average daily volume as of close of busi-
ness on Jan. 26, 2018 of 5,258,836 shares). 
29 FaceTime Interview with Anonymous, supra note 23. 
30 Id. See also POZEN, supra note 25, at 219 (noting the importance of 
supply and demand in investment research and surveying data such as 
“money flows and volume trends”). 
31 NASDAQ, WD-40 Company Common Stock Quote and Summary 
Data, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/wdfc (last visited Jan. 26, 2018). 
32 Id. The ninety-day average daily volume is not provided on the 
NASDAQ website; therefore the fifty-day average daily volume is provided 
in this instance. 
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40 stock would experience a significant hit to share price if a 
portfolio manager tried to sell its entire holding all at once.33 
As a consequence, a fund would choose to “work the order” to 
sell its shares of a low trade volume stock over the course of 
several days to lessen the depression of the stock’s price.34  
The asset type—e.g., stocks or bonds—may influence trad-
ing volume, the availability of counterparties, and liquidity. 
Stock, for example, represents a share of ownership in a com-
pany (i.e., equity); the stockholder is entitled to earnings, or 
dividends.35 Common and preferred stock are the two big 
buckets of equity, with common stock dominating the ex-
changes and serving as the focus of liquidity regulations.36 
The stock market is comprised of central exchange where each 
day investors buy and sell over $5 trillion in assets world-
wide.37 Supply and demand for a given stock, influenced in 
part by company and market-wide news, drive an ever-fluctu-
ating, but readily available, current stock price.38 
 
33 FaceTime Interview with Anonymous, supra note 23; see also POZEN, 
supra note 25, at 217 (“[P]ortfolio managers need to take into account other 
factors relating to the management of a mutual fund. These include the cash 
flows resulting from shareholder purchases and redemptions, as well as the 
liquidity of individual securities and market sectors.”). 
34 FaceTime Interview with Anonymous, supra note 23. 
35 See GAIL ROLLAND, MARKET PLAYERS: A GUIDE TO THE INSTITUTIONS 
IN TODAY’S FINANCIAL MARKETS xxi–xxii (2011) (describing stock attributes); 
see also POZEN, supra note 25, at 211–12 (discussing dividends). 
36 ROLLAND, supra note 35, at 34–35 (discussing the initial public offer-
ing of shares and the choice to offer common or preferred stock); see also 
POZEN, supra note 25, at 2225–28 (discussing common and preferred stock). 
37 See David Scutt, Here’s How Much Currency Is Traded Every Day, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-
how-much-currency-is-traded-every-day-2016-9 [perma.cc/5XU9-859T] 
(discussing the size of the equities market). The World Bank estimates of 
global trading value at $77.5 trillion in 2016. Stocks Traded, Total Value, 
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2018). For a list of major exchanges worldwide, and their 
visualization by size, see All of the World’s Stock Exchanges by Size, MONEY 
PROJECT (Feb. 16, 2016), http://money.visualcapitalist.com/all-of-the-
worlds-stock-exchanges-by-size/ [https://perma. cc/XLE4-ZFUJ]. 
38 See generally, POZEN, supra note 25, at 215–19 (discussing portfolio 
managers and active management strategies that incorporate corporate 
news events). 
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Bonds, on the other hand, are contractual agreements to 
pay money (i.e., a debt) with a range of features including var-
ying qualities, variable or fixed coupons (or interest rates), 
maturities, and yields.39 Interest rates and credit ratings af-
fect bond pricing.40 Bonds primarily trade over the counter 
(“OTC”),41 through intermediaries, such as broker-dealers, in 
order to link counterparties.42 Bonds trade at a variable pace, 
with a particular bond possibly not trading for weeks or even 
months.43 Because of this, current prices may not be readily 
available, making it difficult to trade bonds on the stock mar-
ket.44 OTC bonds may be traded over the telephone so that 
traders can capture the most current information about the 
availability of buyers and the bond features themselves.  
Assets outside the mainstream classes of stocks and bonds 
introduce new complexity and obscurity that impact a secu-
rity’s perceived liquidity.45 For example, a mortgage-backed 
security (“MBS”) experiences a limited trading market, as it 
is a complex, structured investment vehicle with a limited 
consortium of buyers.46 Pools of individual mortgages are col-
lateral for an MBS, which are subject to credit and default 
 
39 Id. at 167–70 (describing the bond market generally and key fea-
tures). 
40 ROLLAND, supra note 35, at xx (“Credit risk is the risk that the bor-
rower will not make the expected payments, such as repaying the debt at 
maturing or the interest payments promised. Interest rate risk comes about 
from these interest payments.”). 
41 Melissa Woodley, Liquidity in the Over-The-Counter Market for Cor-
porate Bonds 1 (Jan. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084560 [perma.cc/ WKE7-
33TC]. 
42 Nathan Foley-Fisher et al., Over-the-Counter Market Liquidity and 
Securities Lending 7 (June 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2869959 [perma.cc/VHX5-
T9LC]. 
43 FaceTime Interview with Anonymous, supra note 23. 
44 Id. 
45 POZEN, supra note 25, at 217 (noting that the liquidity of securities 
is “especially important in thinly traded markets”). 
46 See ROLLAND, supra note 35, at 183–84. 
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risks.47 The interest and principal payments of these mort-
gages support the MBS, and any mortgage default affects the 
pooled security.48 As default rates rise in the pooled mort-
gages, the MBS is also more likely to default.49 Increased de-
fault risk negatively affects an investor’s ability to sell the 
MBS, and, thus negatively affects the value of the security.50 
Limited buyers and depressed pricing may produce a wider 
bid/ask spread on an MBS when a portfolio manager decides 
or is forced to sell an MBS position. 51 A wider bid/ask spread 
indicates that the security is less liquid, and a greater dispar-
ity between the expected market price and price actually re-
ceived indicates a riskier investment.52 The 2008 financial cri-
sis exemplifies a time when homeowners defaulted on 
mortgage payments, which resulted in a downward spiral for 
MBS value where few buyers existed and those who did were 
only willing to pay cents on the dollar.  
The aggregate of individual security prices in the fund pro-
vides the basis for a fund to calculate its daily NAV.53 The 
prices of portfolio securities rise or fall daily in concert with 
market influences and securities transactions conducted in 
the portfolio.54 
Consider $10 million of an MBS priced at $100.00 in a 





50 See POZEN, supra note 25, at 178–80 (discussing the risks associated 
with investing in bonds and noting that “[l]iquidity or marketability risk 
depends on the ease with which an issue can be sold at or near its value”). 
51 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62299 (defining the 
bid/ask spread as the “difference between bid and offer prices for a particu-
lar asset” and mentioning that the spread has “historically been viewed as 
a useful measure for assessing the liquidity of assets that trade in the OTC 
markets”); see also POZEN, supra note 25, at 180 (noting that the primary 
measure of liquidity is the size of the bid/ask spread: the wider the spread, 
the greater the risk). 
52 POZEN, supra note 25, at 180. 
53 See Ciccotello, supra note 7, at 5–6 (discussing NAV calculation com-
ponents and challenges). 
54 Id. 
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a portfolio manager expects to receive when she sells the se-
curity. If a substantial fund redemption occurs, the fund man-
ager must sell assets, including the MBS, to meet the redemp-
tion.55 Assume that on the day they are forced to sell, however, 
the market experiences low trading volume. The broker-
dealer to whom they attempt to sell the MBS knows that there 
is limited demand for it, and thus offers only $99.50. Though 
the fifty-cent hit—$50,000 in total—may seem insignificant in 
relation to near-billion dollar funds, it is a big loss on a single 
trade. With forced selling in an illiquid market, these losses 
can represent a large portion of a fund’s portfolio and com-
pound over time.56 When funds sell steeply discounted assets, 
such as this MBS, in a distressed market with few buyers, the 
sale results in illiquidity and substantial dilution to remain-
ing shareholder investments by means of a reduced NAV.57 
 B. Defining Dilution 
Shareholder dilution is the reduction in a shareholder’s in-
vestment holding—reflected as the NAV times the number of 
fund shares held. When shareholder capital activity—namely, 
inflows to, or outflows from, the fund—occur a NAV price that 
does not mitigate the transaction costs of buying or selling the 
assets in the fund, dilution occurs.58 In other words, dilution 
occurs when a fund’s NAV declines for existing (sedentary) 
 
55 See POZEN, supra note 25, at 217 (describing redemption demands). 
56 Id. See also FaceTime Interview with Anonymous, supra note 23 (in-
terviewee commenting that losses compound over time to become significant 
and terming a loss on ten percent of a fund as “a big knock”); SEC LIQUIDITY 
WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 3. 
57 See The Origins of the Financial Crisis, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-
crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article [perma.cc/YG5E-943E? type=im-
age] (describing the factors that contributed to the financial crisis, the sys-
temic impact of devaluations of CDOs, and the subsequent “fire-sale prices” 
of such assets); see also ROLLAND, supra note 35, at 183–84. 
58 ASS’N OF THE LUX. FUND INDUS., ALFI SWING PRICING SURVEY 4 (Dec. 
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shareholders when the fund buys or sells assets to accommo-
date shareholder purchases or redemptions.59 The triggering 
shareholder(s) does not cover the transaction cost; rather, the 
existing shareholders do so with a reduced NAV.  
For example, assume that a fund has $100 million in total 
assets and that its NAV is $10.00. A typical redemption for a 
large institutional shareholder is $500,000, but a shareholder 
may become unhappy with the fund’s performance and decide 
to withdraw its entire investment in the fund—say, $5 mil-
lion. In order to process the redemption and send cash pro-
ceeds of $5 million to the exiting shareholder, the fund man-
ager must sell five percent of the fund’s portfolio assets. At the 
time of the redemption order, the market is flat—i.e., assets 
were trading at stable and predictable prices—so the fund 
would have carried the $10.00 NAV to the next day. Once the 
transaction is underway, the rapid increase in sales depresses 
the market price, which, combined with transaction costs, de-
creases the fund’s NAV to $9.90 per share.60  
Funds are required to process the shareholder redemption 
at a price based on the next calculated NAV—i.e., on the day 
that the redemption order was placed.61 And the redeeming 
shareholder receives the $10.00 NAV for the following rea-
sons. Funds typically sell securities on the same day, or the 
days immediately following a redemption order. 62 Funds book 
 
59 To illustrate, consider a shareholder who redeems 1000 shares on a 
day when the fund’s NAV is $1000 per share, but the fund incurs significant 
transaction costs in meeting the shareholder redemption—costs that are not 
charged to the exiting fund shareholders, but which is a cost borne by the 
shareholders that stay in the fund. After the redemption closes, the fund’s 
NAV may decline to $990 per share resulting in a dilution in the value of 
the sedentary shareholders’ per share interest in the fund from $1000 to 
$990. See POZEN, supra note 25, at 263–65 (discussing the effect of large 
trade size on sale process and price); see also supra Section II.A. 
60 See POZEN, supra note 25, at 263–65 (discussing the sale process in-
volved in executing large trades and their effect on price); see also supra 
Section II.A. 
61 Pricing of Redeemable Securities for Distribution, 17 C.F.R § 
270.22c-1 (2017). 
62 See Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62326 (discussing 
the redemption process). 
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the security sale price the next business day after the trans-
action.63 The triggering shareholder escapes the negative fi-
nancial impact caused by its redemption order because the 
fund has not yet recorded the financial implications of the se-
curities transactions.64 The remaining shareholders’ portfolio 
value drops because of the decreased NAV—i.e., the dilution 
of their investment. The sedentary shareholders absorb trans-
action-cost effects on the fund’s NAV and long-term perfor-
mance.65 Fund performance declines by one percent in the 
above scenario, but only for the shareholders who remain in 
the fund at the discount NAV of $9.90, and not for the share-
holders who exited at the $10.00 NAV. The remaining share-
holders’ return on investment is thereby reduced by one per-
cent in this limited scenario. Over time, these small negative 
price impacts equal a significant cumulative drag on perfor-
mance over the lifespan of a sedentary shareholders’ invest-
ment.  
One of the SEC’s primary objectives with respect to mutual 
funds is to minimize the impact of redemptions on the value 
of fund shares and prevent dilution.66 Portfolio managers also 
have a vested interest in minimizing dilution as it adversely 
affects the performance of the fund,67 and thus usually ad-
versely affects the portfolio manager’s compensation.68 Port-
 
63 Id. This means that a fund records the transactions that affected the 
NAV on the day after the trades were executed (or trading day, noted as 
T+1). For example, a fund shareholder redeems shares on Monday, causing 
the fund manager to sell fund assets to meet the shareholder redemption. 
The sales may not be recorded, and therefore factored into NAV until Tues-
day (T+1). 
64 See supra Section II.A. 
65 Anne M. Tucker, Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of Citizen 
Shareholders, 125 YALE L. REV. FORUM 163, 179 (2015). 
66 Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9, at 9. 
67 Id. at 10. 
68 A portfolio manager’s bonus compensation is typically tied to the per-
formance of the fund she manages. Disclosures relating to a portfolio man-
ager’s compensation can be found in a fund’s Statement of Additional Infor-
mation attached to the annual prospectus filing (Form NA-1). See e.g., 
Virtus Asset Trust, Supplement to Statement of Additional Information, 
Tucker_VanDenToorn_Final  
No. 1:130]      WILL SWING PRICING SAVE SEDENTARY SHAREHOLDERS? 147 
folio managers also, and importantly, owe shareholders a fi-
duciary duty.69 A fund with a stable shareholder base and rel-
atively low flows and transaction costs is likely to experience 
little dilution.70 Nonetheless, even a fund that experiences 
minimal dilution or shareholder activity can suffer a perfor-
mance drag over time from paying transaction costs related to 
shareholder purchases and redemptions.  
Various jurisdictions, including the United States, have 
developed solutions for mitigating dilution. For example, since 
2002 the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (the 
“FSA”) has permitted funds to charge dilution levies.71 A fund 
may charge an entering or exiting shareholder a tax—i.e., a 
dilution levy—that is paid to the fund rather than to the fund 
manager.72 Part V discusses other methods such as redemp-
tion fees, dual pricing, and redemptions in-kind to allocate 
transaction costs to triggering shareholders and addressing li-
quidity needs. Many international jurisdictions already use 
swing pricing to combat the dilutive effects of unallocated 
transaction costs triggered by active shareholders. 
 
(July 17, 2017), https://www.virtus.com/assets/files/1bo/8622b_as-
settrust_sai.pdf [perma.cc/G4AK-Z8NG] (“Each portfolio manager’s bonus 
may be structured differently but generally incorporates an evaluation of 
the Fund’s investment performance as well as other subjective factors.”). 
69  Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (“The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a 
congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment 
advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at 
least to expose, all conflicts of interest . . . .”). 
70 Id. at 64. 
71 Id. at E-7; see also COLUMBIA THREADNEEDLE INVS., Fund Charges 
and Costs Explained, http://www.columbiathreadneedle.com/fees/fund-
charges-and-costs-explained/ [perma.cc/GW92-HH25] (providing an exam-
ple of dilution adjustment transaction costs). 
72 See Dilution Levy, SOMERSET CAPITAL MGMT., http://som-
ersetcm.com/investment-approach/dilution-levy/ [perma.cc/E23A-XXRY] 
(describing a dilution levy event in June 2014). 
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III. SWING PRICING 
A. Swing Pricing Overview 
Swing pricing is a process by which a mutual fund adjusts 
its daily NAV in an attempt to impose transaction costs on the 
shareholders initiating the expense-generating activity.73 A 
fund incurs transaction costs when a shareholder redeems 
shares, for example, and, as a result, the fund must sell port-
folio securities to raise cash to meet the redemption order. 
Similarly, a large shareholder purchase into the fund will 
prompt the fund manager to purchase securities aligned with 
its investment strategy, again incurring certain transaction 
costs. Portfolio managers are typically more concerned with 
large redemptions than purchases, because purchases present 
less urgency to take action; a fund can maintain a cash posi-
tion and wait for an opportune time to purchase securities. 
Expenses include transaction fees and charges—e.g., com-
missions, custody fees, transfer taxes, or repatriation 
costs74—as well as costs such as market impact and spread 
costs arising from purchases or redemptions.75 Attributing ex-
penses to the triggering, and mobilized, shareholder protects 
the existing, and sedentary, shareholders from incurring the 
expense and thereby diluting their shares.76 Simply stated, a 
fund’s NAV could be adjusted up in the event of a large pur-
chase, and adjusted down in the event of a large redemption.77  
A mutual fund can shield its investors from market impact 
by utilizing swing pricing. A mutual fund confronts market 
impact when it must sell securities at a lower price than it 
 
73 See Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62276 (defining 
swing pricing).  
74 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62337; see also Final 
Rules, supra note 4, at 82105 (discussing transaction costs). 
75 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62337; see also Final 
Rules, supra note 4, at 82105 (discussing redemptions). 
76 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62329; see also Final 
Rules, supra note 4, at 82094 (discussing dilution). 
77 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62329; see also Final 
Rules, supra note 4, at 82094 (discussing price adjustments). 
Tucker_VanDenToorn_Final  
No. 1:130]      WILL SWING PRICING SAVE SEDENTARY SHAREHOLDERS? 149 
would have if given more time to sell.78 At times, a fund may 
be compelled to sell a less liquid security, or a smaller market 
security where a large sale would depress the price, in order 
to meet a redemption.79  
Shareholder inequity may motivate swing pricing imple-
mentation. When costs diminish a fund’s NAV, shareholders 
who remain in the fund hold a portfolio with fewer reflected 
assets. Any shareholder who redeems the following day (or 
later) will do so at a lower redemption price,80 harming exist-
ing fund shareholders. Conversely, the diminished NAV ben-
efits an entering fund shareholder who is able to purchase 
more shares at an artificially lower price.81 Swing pricing, if 
applied in this situation, would cause a downward adjustment 
to the NAV, externalizing the transaction costs (from the per-
spective of the fund and remaining shareholders) and allocat-
ing it to the redeeming (exiting) shareholder. Swing pricing 
smooths NAV fluctuation and price impacts after large share-
holder transactions, thereby supporting more consistent fund 
performance and diminishing the negative impact to, and un-
equal treatment of, remaining shareholders.82 
B. International Perspectives on Swing Pricing  
While swing pricing rules are new to U.S. markets, they 
reflect established mutual fund practice trends in Europe, 
with asset managers based in in the United Kingdom (the 
“UK”), Switzerland, and France applying swing pricing.83 
 
78 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
79 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
80 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
81 Such a significant NAV deterioration opens opportunities for arbi-
trage, particularly for large institutional shareholders who may have mul-
tiple accounts. Utilizing multiple accounts to conduct arbitrage—i.e., the 
selling out of one account and purchasing in another at an opportune time 
when the NAV is reduced significantly—permits the shareholder to circum-
vent a fund’s short-term trading and market-timing monitoring process. 
82 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82130. 
83 CHRISTINE CUSATIS, SWING PRICING 101, at 3 (2016), 
http://www.nicsa.org/downloads/White%20Papers/SwingPricing101_White 
Paper_March2016.pdf [perma.cc/W59S-SNMB]; see also FRENCH ASSET 
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Luxembourg is the largest mutual fund capital in the world 
outside of the United States, and funds domiciled in Luxem-
bourg have used swing pricing for two decades.84 In 2006, the 
Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry (“ALFI”) con-
vened a working group to study the theory and practice of 
swing pricing and released a swing pricing survey and guide-
lines in 2011, with updates in 2015. 85 The SEC relied on ALFI 
research and data in creating the U.S. swing pricing proposed 
rules.86 The remainder of this Article compares and contrasts, 
where meaningful, the U.S. rules with those in European ju-
risdictions. 
C. U.S. Swing Pricing Rules 
In October 2016, the SEC finalized and enacted the Liquid-
ity Risk Management Program Rules87 and the Swing Pricing 
Rules,88 originally released September 22, 2015.89 All open-
end management investment companies, excluding money 
market funds and exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”), must com-
ply with the broader liquidity rules, and may implement 
swing pricing practices.90 The swing pricing rules—the focus 
of this Article—will be effective in November 2018,91 and the 
liquidity risk management program rules have a compliance 
 
MGMT. ASS’N, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ASSET MANAGERS USING SWING PRICING 
AND VARIABLE ANTI-DILUTION LEVIES (2016), http://www.afg.asso.fr/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2014/06/GuidePro_SwingPricing_actualise_2016_ENG.pdf 
[perma.cc/JK82-3WU2] (describing swing pricing policies and procedures in 
France). 
84 CUSATIS, supra note 83, at 3. 
85 ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 6. 
86 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62327; see also Final 
Rules supra note 4, at 82095 (citing to ALFI for guidance on swing pricing 
rules). 
87 Final Liquidity Risk Rules, supra note 4, at 82142. 
88 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82084. 
89 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62388. 
90 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82089; Final Liquidity Risk Rules, su-
pra note 4, at 82142. 
91 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82084. Because swing pricing rules are 
optional, the rules have a stated effective date, not an effective compliance 
date. 
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date of December 1, 2018 for large funds and June 1, 2019 for 
small funds.92 The rules aim to promote fairness in invest-
ments, prevent investor dilution, and discourage early re-
demptions in times of heightened illiquidity.93 The following 
subsections explore the main swing pricing rule components, 
including the voluntary nature of the rules, the swing thresh-
old, and the swing factor. They also examine a fund’s board of 
directors’ implementation and oversight responsibilities, fidu-
ciary duties, as well as reporting and shareholder disclosure 
requirements.  
1. Optional 
Swing pricing is optional, which creates an opt-in ap-
proach.94 A mutual fund may implement swing pricing if the 
fund’s board of directors adopts swing pricing policies and pro-
cedures.95  
 
92 Final Liquidity Risk Rules, supra note 4, at 307. Because the liquid-
ity risk management program rules are mandatory and thus the effective 
date is the same as the compliance date. 
93 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82117–18 (“The primary goals of the 
swing pricing regulations are to promote investor protection by allowing a 
fund, if it chooses, to use swing pricing to mitigate potential dilution of non-
transacting shareholders’ interests that could occur when the fund incurs 
costs as a result of other investors’ purchase or redemption activity . . . . 
Furthermore, because redeeming shareholders do not bear the cost of exist-
ing a fund, shareholders might have an incentive for early redemptions in 
times of liquidity stress because of a first-mover advantage, which could re-
sult in further dilution of non-transactions shareholders’ interests. To the 
extent that such a first-mover advantage triggers the sale of less liquid port-
folio investments at discounted or even fire sales prices, correlated invest-
ments and funds and other investors holding these and correlated invest-
ments will be negatively impacted . . . .”). 
94 Id. at 82128 (“But because funds differ notably in terms of their par-
ticular circumstances and risks, as well as with respect to the tools funds 
use to manage risks relating to liquidity and shareholder purchases and 
redemptions, we decided to adopt a rule that would permit swing pricing as 
a voluntary tool for funds.”). 
95 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82108. 
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2. Swing Threshold 
A mutual fund that opts in to swing pricing must set a 
threshold at which its swing pricing procedures are triggered 
and NAV will be adjusted96—a practice known as partial, as 
opposed to “full,” swing pricing.97 Whether the swing pricing 
rules should be partial or full was a matter of debate in the 
rule comments, with the SEC electing a partial approach in 
the proposed and final rules.98  
The swing threshold is a specified percentage of a fund’s 
NAV, and is triggered when the absolute value of net pur-
chases and redemptions exceeds it.99 Trading within the mu-
tual fund, as a whole, as opposed to within individual share 
classes, triggers the threshold.100 Balanced redemptions and 
purchases will not trigger swing pricing because the regula-
tory focus is on net transactions.101 Swing pricing will only ap-
ply to significant one-directional trading. 
The SEC established a process to set the swing threshold 
rather than prescribing a formula or set percentage for the 
threshold.102 The threshold, however, must be greater than 
 
96 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82088. 
97 See ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 4 (“Swing pricing has two 
distinct forms: First, the ‘full’ swing method, whereby the NAV adjusts up 
or down every NAV calculation day based on the direction of net capital 
activity regardless of the size of shareholder dealing; Second, the ‘partial’ 
swing method that is only invoked when the net capital activity is greater 
than a pre-determined threshold . . . .”). 
98 Invesco, Comment Letter on Liquidity Management 6 (Jan. 13, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-75.pdf [perma.cc/ 
GV2Y-LW7K] (stating that it should be mandatory, partial swing pricing in 
order to encourage implementation and avoid the equalization critiques 
raised below). 
99 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82120. 
100 Id. at 82099 (“[B]ecause the economic activity causing dilution oc-
curs at the fund level, it would not be appropriate to employ swing pricing 
at the share class level to target such dilution.”). 
101 Id. at 82128. Note that the SEC rejected comment suggestions that 
only net redemptions (as opposed to net subscriptions or redemptions) trig-
ger the swing pricing threshold. Id. at 82097–98. 
102 Id. at 82095, 82097 (“On balance, we [the SEC] continue to believe 
that setting a minimum threshold for all funds would not be appropriate, 
Tucker_VanDenToorn_Final  
No. 1:130]      WILL SWING PRICING SAVE SEDENTARY SHAREHOLDERS? 153 
zero.103 Funds using swing pricing must determine their own 
swing threshold based on fund size, cash and cash equiva-
lents, borrowing, and historical purchase and redemption ac-
tivities, among other factors.104 
The SEC identifies four non-exhaustive “factors” for con-
sideration in setting the threshold.105 These factors include 
fund portfolio contents and history, investment strategy and 
likely transaction costs, and cash holdings.106 Two factors—
investment strategy and cash—overlap with the liquidity risk 
assessment components required under the suite of new li-
quidity regulations.107  
First, a fund should evaluate the “size, frequency, and vol-
atility of historical net purchases or net redemption of fund 
shares during normal and stressed periods.”108 For example, 
consider a smaller fund with a shareholder who controls over 
fifty percent of the fund. The fund could experience an infre-
quent but significant redemption, versus a large fund with a 
diverse base of shareholder constituents who trade frequently. 
The swing threshold for each fund would differ based upon in-
vestor flow expectations. This factor also indicates that an in-
vestment adviser who manages multiple funds in the same 
fund family may consider a different threshold for each 
fund.109  
 
and that funds should be provided the flexibility to implement swing pricing 
at a threshold level that best fits their particular circumstances based on 
the required factors and the guidance set forth herein.”). 
103 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82097. 
104 Final Rules supra note 4, at 82095. 
105 Id. See also id. at 82096 (“The rule does not preclude a fund from 
considering other factors that the fund believes may be relevant.”). 
106 Final Rules supra note 4, at 82095. 
107 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82096 (describing the overlap as “not 
surprising, because evaluating a fund’s liquidity risk may be relevant to de-
termining the fund’s swing threshold”). 
108 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82095. 
109 For example, if an investment adviser manages a large cap equity 
fund (highly liquid) with infrequent flows, a small cap equity fund (less liq-
uid) with large flows, and an alternative fund (least liquid) with constant 
flows, the adviser may choose a different threshold for each based on each 
fund’s unique characteristics. An investment advisor may manage a variety 
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Second, a mutual fund must consider its “investment strat-
egy and the liquidity of the fund’s portfolio assets.” 110 As dis-
cussed above,111 the asset type being sold is germane to its 
liquidity, which in turn affects the daily NAV of the fund. As-
set types such as MBS, banks loans, and derivatives will nat-
urally be less liquid than large-capitalization stocks and U.S. 
Treasury securities. If a significant portion of the fund portfo-
lio is invested in equities or U.S. Treasuries, the fund’s thresh-
old may need to be set higher, as it can better accommodate 
redemptions while still maintaining liquidity and a stable 
NAV than if it were heavily invested in bonds and MBS.  
Transaction costs unique to the asset market are a third, 
related factor.112 Different assets, as discussed above, have 
different exposure to market impact costs where liquidity and 
availability influence price fluctuations, especially in the face 
of a large transaction. In this way, the SEC requires that fund 
managers consider market impact costs in setting a threshold. 
Additionally, different portfolio assets have different commis-
sions, expenses, etc.113 
Fourth, funds must consider cash holdings and alternative 
funding sources.114 How much cash or cash equivalent a fund 
holds in anticipation of liquidity needs may offset the market 
impact of a less liquid portfolio. Many funds also currently uti-
lize a credit facility such as a line of credit or inter-fund lend-
 
of funds such as a small bank loan fund with frequent flows, a large-cap 
equity fund with minimal flows, a large alternative fund with average flows, 
and a mid-size U.S. Treasury fund with volatile flows based on market fluc-
tuations. Because of the different asset types, sizes, and flows, and therefore 
the differences in the relative liquidity of each fund, the swing thresholds 
may be different based on each fund’s ability to meet its redemptions. 
110 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82095 (discussing Rule 22c-1(a)(3) and 
threshold factors). 
111 See supra Section II.A. 
112 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82095. 
113 The author has made this observation in her role in the mutual fund 
industry. See also POZEN, supra note 25, at 516 (discussing mutual fund 
fees). 
114 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82095. 
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ing, borrowing against it in order to satisfy a shareholder’s re-
demption.115 Cash on hand, or the ability to borrow cash, to 
satisfy shareholder redemptions allows the fund to wait for a 
better market price with sufficient buyers and potentially 
curb losses from a forced sale of less liquid securities.  
Other jurisdictions’ experiences with swing pricing in-
formed the SEC’s threshold framework.116 In December 2015, 
the ALFI—a main organization studying mutual fund swing 
pricing in the international mutual fund capital of Luxem-
bourg—released new information on swing pricing.117 Accord-
ing to the ALFI’s 2015 swing pricing survey, the most common 
swing threshold was one percent or less.118 Roughly half of re-
spondents indicated a three percent swing threshold or less, 
and the remaining half of managers reported a three percent 
or more threshold.119 In addition, the majority of responding 
managers indicated that they distinguish thresholds by fund, 
primarily based on fund-specific characteristics such as in-
vestment objective, fund size, or asset class.120 
3. Swing Factor 
The swing factor is an amount, expressed as a percentage 
of the fund’s NAV, by which a fund adjusts its NAV per share 
once the swing threshold (discussed above) is met.121 The 
 
115 The author has made this observation in her role in the mutual fund 
industry. 
116 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82096. 
117 ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 6; ASS’N OF THE LUX. FUND IN-
DUS., SWING PRICING GUIDELINES 11 (2015) [hereinafter ALFI 2015 GUIDE-
LINES], http://www.alfi.lu/ sites/alfi.lu/files/Swing-Pricing-guidelines-fi-
nal.pdf [perma.cc/ URM6-Q5ZJ] (explaining that the ALFI provides 
additional considerations in setting the swing threshold: (1) setting a 
threshold too low will increase NAV volatility; (2) setting it too high will 
void the purpose of protecting from dilution; (3) whether a consistent thresh-
old across all funds is appropriate; and (4) correlating high liquidity to a 
higher threshold and lower liquidity to a low threshold). 
118 ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 11. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 12. 
121 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82103. 
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swing factor is the discount or tax applied to the NAV to ac-
count for any near-term liquidity stress experienced by the 
fund. A fund’s swing factor must be calculated122 based on ex-
pected near-term costs generated by net purchases or redemp-
tions incurred on the day that the swing factor is used.123  
Near-term costs are estimated costs that are not antici-
pated to be incurred by the fund for several days, including 
spread costs.124 Transaction fees—including mark-ups and 
downs, brokerage commissions and custody fees, transfer 
taxes, repatriation costs, and fees for investments in other 
funds—are additional near-term costs.125 Charges resulting 
from purchases or sales and borrowing-related costs—such as 
interest charges or credit draw downs—generated with re-
demptions are also near-term costs.126  
Swing factors are not intended to be stable, but are de-
signed to accommodate fluctuation.127 The swing factor can be 
determined using a base amount subject to adjustments or 
calculated based upon a formula or algorithm.128 
Each participating fund sets their own swing pricing pro-
cedures, subject to the following restrictions. First, any swing 
factor used must be reasonable in relation to the cost incurred 
by the fund.129 Second, a mutual fund’s board of directors 
must establish and disclose an upper swing limit that cannot 
 
122 The designated swing pricing administrator within the fund sets 
the swing factor, though the upper limit must be approved by the board. 
Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82104, 82108. See also id. at 82108 (requiring 
swing pricing funds to designate an officer responsible for administering the 
policy). 
123 Id. at 82104. 
124 Id. 
125 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82104–05. See also Swing Pricing First 
Proposal, supra note 4, at 62336 (also including market impact costs, which 
were eliminated from consideration in setting the swing factor in the final 
rule). 
126 Final Rules, supra note 4 at 82104–05; Swing Pricing First Pro-
posal, supra note 4, at 62336–37. 
127 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62336. 
128 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82107. 
129 Id. at 82106. 
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exceed two percent of assets,130 which avoids high NAV ad-
justments and resulting volatility.131 The two-percent cap re-
flects common practice in Luxembourg, as well as similar caps 
on redemption fees under SEC Rule 22c-2 and restrictions on 
money market funds.132 The swing pricing limits reflect the 
balance the SEC struck between fund discretion and investor-
protection concerns.133 
The final swing pricing rules differ from the proposed rules 
by excluding market impact costs and asset values from the 
swing factors.134 The SEC cited difficulty in calculating mar-
ket impact costs and the limited experience in other swing 
pricing jurisdictions.135 ALFI’s 2015 swing pricing survey doc-
umented that few funds incorporate market impact costs into 
its swing factor.136 
The final rules also excluded the value of assets purchased 
or sold from the swing factor because it would have required 
“a level of precision in setting the swing factor . . . that would 
undercut funds being able to set a swing factor on a periodic 
basis.”137 Asset value, if left in, would have required managers 
to evaluate possible future trades—a difficult task in volatile 
market conditions. Consider for example, that a fund manager 
 
130 Id. at 82106. Funds must disclose the upper limits in Form N-1A 
and Form N-CEN. Id. at 82107. Under the proposed rules, a fund could 
choose a ceiling, but was not required to do so. Swing Pricing First Proposal, 
supra note 4, at 62337–38; Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82108–09 (discuss-
ing comments received on swing pricing threshold). 
131 See supra note 117. 
132 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82106–07; ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra 
note 58, at 4, 11 (in its 2015 survey, ALFI notes that most fund managers 
set a cap on the swing factor, with two percent, the most common number). 
133 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82109. 
134 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82105. 
135 Id. Note that the third swing threshold considers “costs associated 
with transactions in the markets in which the fund invests” so the rules 
indirectly incorporate market impact costs. Id. at 82095. 
136 ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 9–10. Other variations in the 
swing factor in European jurisdictions include a combination of bid/offer 
spread impacts, excluding transaction taxes, and even excluding explicit 
transaction costs. Id. 
137 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82105. 
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may prepare to mitigate liquidity concerns if a threshold is 
met. She may utilize a credit facility138 with the plan to trade 
the following day after volatility has decreased. She has an 
idea of what to sell, but if the following day an off-setting pur-
chase is made into the fund, it negates the need for any addi-
tional securities transactions. Downward adjustment to the 
NAV because of the anticipated, but unrealized, transaction 
would invert the investor protection and anti-dilution princi-
ples of the swing pricing rules.  
4. BOD Implementation and Oversight 
The SEC’s swing pricing rules emphasize implementation 
procedures and ongoing oversight to facilitate accountability, 
fiduciary duty-triggering actions, and shareholder disclosure. 
a. Operational Accountability  
A fund must segregate swing pricing operations from fund 
portfolio management.139 A fund board must also appoint a 
swing pricing administrator—a fund officer, investment advi-
sor, or committee—responsible for implementing and oversee-
ing swing pricing.140 The swing pricing administrator submits 
 
138 A credit facility is a line of credit available to funds from a bank or 
other financial institution that allows funds to borrow instead of selling 
shares in an unfavorable market in order to meet large redemptions or ad-
dress liquidity concerns with small cap companies. See, e.g., LEE GREMIL-
LION, MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE FOR IN-
VESTMENT PROFESSIONALS 115 (2005) (discussing fund lines of credit). 
139 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82108, 82110. The SEC clarified seg-
regation requirements in the final rules and specifically excluded portfolio 
managers in order to discourage potential incentives to set swing factors to 
manipulate short-term performance, benchmark setting, and peer compar-
isons. Id. at 82110–11. 
140 Id. at 82108, 82110. See also Pricing of Redeemable Securities for 
Distribution, Redemption and Repurchase, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2017) (de-
scribing redeemable securities). A fund’s valuation committee would be a 
natural fit to house swing pricing functions as they relate to the primary 
function of the valuation committee. For a discussion of mutual fund boards 
of directors, see GREMILLION, supra note 138, at 40–42 (discussing mutual 
fund board functions and committees). 
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a written report to the fund’s board. 141 The report must re-
view the adequacy of the fund’s swing pricing policies and pro-
cedures, implementation effectiveness, success in mitigating 
dilution, materials changes since the last report, and the 
fund’s compliance with swing threshold and factor require-
ments under the SEC rules.142 The swing pricing administra-
tor also must comply with record keeping requirements under 
SEC Rule 31a-2(a)(2) for computing and evidencing the daily 
NAV.143  
When the swing threshold is met, the administrator must 
document the unswung NAV, data for the swing factor calcu-
lation, the actual level of redemptions or purchases exceeding 
the threshold, the swing factor applied, and any back-testing 
data to verify the swing calculation.144 
b. Board Accountability & Fiduciary Duty 
A fund’s board of directors must establish swing pricing 
policies and procedures—importantly the swing threshold, 
swing factor, and swing procedures—approved by a majority 
of the fund’s independent directors.145 Additionally the board 
reviews the swing pricing reports and implementation process 
at least annually.146 The SEC likens the board’s role with 
 
141 The swing pricing report is another reason to consider locating 
swing pricing functions within the valuation committee because the re-
port—similar to the new compliance and new LMP reports—would likely 
entail back testing and other types of verification, which are analyses al-
ready performed by the fund’s valuation committee. For a discussion of the 
types of post-trade compliance monitoring that may be a part of a fund’s 
valuation committee work, see GREMILLION, supra note 138, at 121–23 (de-
scribing post trade compliance procedures). 
142 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82108–09. See also Liquidity Risk 
Management Programs, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-4 (2017). 
143 Final Rules supra note 4, at 82111. 
144 Id. at 82125. 
145 Id. at 82108–09. 
146 Id. at 82109, 82111. See also Compliance Procedures and Practices 
of Certain Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2017) (requiring 
that a board receive reports on policies and procedures reasonably intended 
to prevent the violation of federal securities law, including Rule 22c-1). 
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swing pricing to its significant responsibility regarding valu-
ation and pricing related matters under the Investment Advi-
sors Act.147 
The SEC attempts to strike the right balance between 
board oversight and the role of management in daily opera-
tions with the swing pricing rules.148 The required fund board 
actions under the rules trigger fiduciary duties and actions 
must be taken in the best interest of fund shareholders. Fidu-
ciary duty liability follows board action and, at least symboli-
cally, transaction-price monitoring.149 In discharging its du-
ties, the board may rely upon officer reports and data provided 
by management, including the swing pricing administra-
tor.150 
 
147 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82108. See also Investment Advisors 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (2017) (“‘Value’, with respect to assets of registered 
investment companies . . . means . . . with respect to other securities and 
assets owned at the end of the last preceding fiscal quarter, fair value at the 
end of such quarter, as determined in good faith by the board of directors.”). 
SEC regulations regarding securities valuation include 17 C.F.R. §§ 2a-4, 
2a-7(c)(1)(i), 2a-7(g)(1)(i)(A)–(C), and 18f-3d. 
148 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82108. Some commentators requested 
that the fund advisor, with better daily operational knowledge, oversee and 
administer swing pricing. 
149 Id. at 82109. See also Interpretive Matters Concerning Independent 
Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 
24083, 64 FR 59877, 59877–79 (Nov. 3, 1999) (discussing the independence 
of mutual fund directors). For a discussion of the perceived conflict of inter-
est between mutual fund boards of directors and the investor advisors, es-
pecially as related to fee structures and oversight functions, see, e.g., R. 
GLENN HUBBARD ET AL., THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY: COMPETITION AND IN-
VESTOR WELFARE 20–24 (2010); cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation 
to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinter-
ested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1017, 1040 (2005) (“One can have relatively moderate expectations for the 
performance of disinterested directors and still believe that the strategy 
adds some value, and there is a body of evidence to support this.”). 
150 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82110. See also Letter of Michael Did-
iuk, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, to Dorothy Berry, Chair, Indep. Dirs. Council 
and Jameson Baxter, Chair, Mutual Fund Dirs. Forum (Nov. 2, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2010/idc-
mfdf110210.pdf [perma.cc/73AY-D8DW] (urging mutual fund board reli-
ance on summary quarterly reports). 
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A participating fund’s board of directors is responsible for 
overseeing policies to identify and correct errors in swing pric-
ing  estimates and application.151 The swing pricing adminis-
trator, overseen by a fund’s board of directors, is responsible 
for ensuring the reasonableness and accuracy of any swing 
pricing system.152  
c. Transparency & Shareholder Disclosures 
In the final rules and in response to extensive comments, 
the SEC revised the reporting components of price deviations 
on participating funds’ financial statements. Utilizing Form 
N-1A, the annual registration form for investment compa-
nies,153 participating funds must report swing pricing compo-
nents in a fund’s financial highlights, notes to the financial 
statement, statement of assets and liabilities, and statement 
of changes in net assets.154  
The financial highlights section of Form N-1A is the focus 
of the required disclosures. Funds’ financial statement notes 
will include disclosures that a fund has adopted swing pricing, 
the methods to determine whether the swing threshold is met, 
whether swing pricing was utilized in the reporting period, 
and if so, what effects it had on a fund’s reported NAV.155 
Funds must explain swing pricing to provide investors with 
 
151 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82111–12. Policies may include the 
swing pricing estimate components and the use of back testing of estimated 
fund flows to verify the accuracy and reliability of a fund’s estimation tech-
niques. Id. at 82114–15. 
152 Id. at 82115 (noting that it is not a fund’s auditor’s responsibility to 
ensure reasonableness and accuracy because auditors do not have the req-
uisite “expertise”). 
153 Form N-1A. See also 17 C.F.R. § 270.8b-5 et seq. (2005). 
154 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82111–13. Participating funds are also 
encouraged to discuss swing pricing, as applicable, in the existing prospec-
tus and statement of additional information sections. See id. at 82116 n.366. 
155 Id. at 82114. See SEC Form N-1A., Item 6(d). The required disclo-
sures are similar to what funds report when using securities lending pro-
grams or lines of credit. Questions remain about whether auditors and coun-
sel must, or should, provide opinions about the appropriateness of the 
actions taken. 
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the general information needed to understand it.156 Partici-
pating funds must report the upper swing limit. The SEC 
characterized the reported upper limit as a “critical” disclo-
sure assisting investors in comprehending investment risks 
associated with particular funds.157 It also creates transpar-
ency regarding potential price adjustments. Importantly, and 
to prevent gaming and unfair trading, participating funds are 
not required to disclose the swing threshold or swing factor in 
the prospectus.158 
Participating funds must make additional disclosures in a 
variety of formats and subject to different valuation stand-
ards. For example, participating funds can report the swung 
NAV as a separate line item in addition to the GAAP (the U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) NAV.159 Partici-
pating funds will report the GAAP NAV, rather than a swung 
NAV, on the statement of assets and liabilities160 and in com-
municating shareholders’ total financial return.161 Participat-
ing funds will report the swung NAV on the statement of 
changes in net assets to reflect the number of shares and the 
dollar amounts received and paid for shares for shares sold or 
redeemed.162 The technical specificity of the additional disclo-
sure rules reveal the operational complexity and fundamental 
change to mutual fund operations required by swing pricing. 
 
156 Id. at 82116. See also SEC Form N-1A, Item 6 (instructing funds on 
required share purchase and sale disclosures). 
157 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82106. See also Amended Part C of 
Form N-CEN (outlining disclosure of the swing factor upper limit). 
158 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82116. 
159 Id. at 82113. 
160 The final rules did not implement an amendment to Regulation S-
X rule 6-04.19 to require funds to disclose the swung NAV, as originally 
proposed. Id. at 82112. The GAAP NAV should incorporate the effects of 
swing pricing through the accounting period. Id. 
161 Id. at 82113–14 (citing to the incorporation of swung NAV pricing 
effects in the total return using GAAP NAV). 
162 Id. at 82113. See also 17 CFR 210.6-09.4(b) (establishing the current 
regulations on mutual fund share price reporting). 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SWING PRICING COMMENTS & 
RULE RAMIFICATIONS 
The mutual fund industry actively participated in the no-
tice and comment period of the proposed rules and influenced 
the final rules. The SEC extended the liquidity rule comment 
period to January 13, 2016, during which time it received 89 
comments, 48 of which addressed swing pricing. Roughly half 
(48.8%) generally supported swing pricing, and half did not. 
The submitted comments varied in length, relevance, and 
technicality.163 The comments provided a technical back-
ground to the proposed rules, and informed the analysis of the 
benefits and detriments of the rules in the following subsec-
tions.  
The swing pricing comments grouped around the following 
issues: general liquidity benefits, cost spreading and dilution, 
the role of board oversight, transparency/disclosure issues to 
shareholders, implementation expenses, operational concerns 
regarding the timing and price calculations in the U.S. mutual 

















163 See, e.g., John Wahh, Comment Letter on Swing Pricing (Oct. 1, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-2.htm [perma.cc/ 
83BQ-8YHS] (totaling 1 page in length); cf. Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, 
supra note 9 (totaling 117 pages in length). 
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Swing pricing promises three main benefits to individual 
investors, the mutual fund industry, and the investment land-
scape. First, swing pricing may benefit individual investors by 
mitigating dilution of invested assets caused by other inves-
tors’ transactions costs. Second, swing pricing offers benefits 
to mutual funds through higher reported investment returns 
and a larger asset pool if funds can successfully siphon out 
transaction costs from its valuations. Third, swing pricing re-
moves disincentives for long-term investment positions (the 
default of so many American retirement investors), counters 
first-mover advantages in a liquidity crisis, and levels the 
playing field between active and sedentary investors. In Part 
VI, this Article evaluates the relative weight of these benefits 
from the authors’ academic and industry perspectives. 
Swing pricing counteracts the dilutive nature of mutual 
fund shareholder purchases and redemptions where the 
transaction cost of the activity may not be fully paid by the 
initiating shareholders.164 Without swing pricing, long-term 
 
























Expenses Intermed. Safe Harbor Timing BOD Disclos. Flex.
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mutual fund shareholders who were, and remain, investors in 
the fund may finance and subsidize transaction costs associ-
ated with mutual fund shareholder exit or new investment.165 
SEC comments generally supported the dilution-mitigating 
effects of swing pricing.166 Shifting transaction costs to trig-
gering shareholders and away from the existing shareholders 
facilitates equitable pricing and returns among all sharehold-
ers. Swing pricing removes the unintended preferential pric-
ing that funds may inadvertently give to active, over seden-
tary, investors.  
Experts debate the superiority of certain investment strat-
egies and approaches, but there is evidence and agreement on 
the eroding effects of fees on investment returns.167 The indi-
vidual transaction costs shifted from triggering, active mutual 
fund shareholders to sedentary, long-term mutual fund share-
holders is small compared to mutual fund assets as a whole, 
and even the assets of individual investors. The collective 
transaction costs, especially when applied to sedentary share-
holders investing in a single fund over an extended period, is 
significant in absolute terms.168 A 2013 study estimated that 
 
165 ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 6. 
166 See Charted Fin. Analyst Inst., Comments Letter on Swing Pricing, 
(Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-34.pdf 
[perma.cc/ Q874-6BKW] (“We generally support giving funds the option to 
use swing pricing as a way to mitigate the dilution of share value for fund 
shareowners as a result of transaction costs related to purchases and re-
demptions.”). 
167 See e.g., Investor Bulletin: Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, SEC 
(May 12, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/files/ib_mutualfundfees.pdf 
[perma.cc/P3GK-CB6C] (“The more you pay in fees and expenses, the less 
money you will have in your investment portfolios, and These fees and ex-
penses really add up over time. Given the compounding effect of fund fees 
and expenses and their impact on your investment returns, you may want 
to use a mutual fund cost calculation to compute how the costs of different 
mutual funds would add up over time.”). 
168 High mutual fund fees can consume up to thirty percent of an in-
vestor’s return on a thirty-year investment, and liquidity fees contribute to 
the erosion of investor returns. Liquidity fees are relatively low in compar-
ison with fees charged by mutual funds, but in absolute terms, liquidity 
transaction costs extract real costs from sedentary investors. See e.g., Su-
sanna Kim, 401(k) Fees May Cut 30% from Retirement Balance, ABC NEWS 
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sedentary mutual fund investors absorbed trading and liquid-
ity costs of $10–17 billon.169 Additional studies estimated the 
trading costs reduced annual returns “of actively managed 
U.S., international and global equity mutual funds by an av-
erage of 26 basis points on an equal-weighted basis and 20 
basis points asset-weighted over the 2007 to 2013 period.”170 
Mutual fund investors entering through a retirement savings 
plan—such as a 401(k)—are among the investors likely to 
bear the residual transaction costs if unmitigated by swing 
pricing.171  
In addition to preventing an undue advantage to active 
mutual fund shareholders, swing pricing may positively affect 
mutual fund shareholder returns and correlated fund man-
ager compensation.172 The 2015 ALFI survey demonstrated 
 
(May 30, 2012), http://www.demos.org/news/401k-fees-may-cut-30-retire-
ment-balance [perma.cc/3QUP-XLGN] (reporting that average 401(k) fees 
can consume thirty percent of retirement savings); see also Tucker, supra 
note 65, at 181. 
169 Miles Livingston & David Rakowski, Mutual Fund Liquidity and 
Conflicts of Interest, 23 J. APPLIED FIN. 95, 97–103 (2013); see also Tucker, 
supra note 65, at 179. 2016 SEC comments from the same sources estimated 
the dilution costs at $20 billion annually. Seymour Sacks, Sacks Equaliza-
tion Model, Inc., Comment Letter on Swing Pricing (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-19.pdf [perma.cc/9A6L-
CJ2Q] (estimating “that this trading activity fees and including market im-
pact costs, are costing existing shareholders an estimated total of $20 billion 
a year”). 
170 Eaton Vance Inv. Advisors, Comment Letter on Swing Pricing (June 
13, 2016) https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-151.pdf 
[perma.cc/RCX3-MYL]; see also Swaffield, Comment Letter on Swing Pric-
ing 8–9 (Jan. 13, 2016). 
171 Retirement investors entering through plans such as 401(k) have 
limited exit options because they “are likely to be low-dollar (due to contri-
bution limits); long-term (due to tax penalties on preretirement-age with-
drawals); and unsophisticated in account allocation strategies and manage-
ment.” Tucker supra note 65, at 164. See also id. at 168–69 (discussing why 
retirement investors are comparatively “locked in” or sedentary compared 
with retail investors). 
172 Cf. Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 170 (disclaiming the 
net benefits of swing pricing). “[T]he aggregate returns of fund sharehold-
ers, before expenses, are exactly the same whether or not a fund uses swing 
pricing. It’s a zero sum game: the observed improvement in fund returns 
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swing pricing’s positive effect on mutual fund returns.173 By 
shielding the fund, and therefore the investors, from liquidity 
transaction costs, the fund retains a larger asset pool, which 
in turn increases NAV, or the trading value of the fund.174 If, 
for example, a fund reallocates $1 million in liquidity transac-
tion costs to the triggering/active shareholders, then the 
fund’s assets under management reflect the retained $1 mil-
lion, the NAV reflects the higher asset pool, and manager’s 
performance incentives are calculated based on the higher as-
set pool. The SEC posits that swing pricing could “indirectly 
foster capital formation by bolstering investor confidence.”175 
The theory is that if potential investors, particularly long-
term investors, understand the anti-dilution protections of 
swing pricing, they will be more likely to invest in mutual 
funds offering swing pricing.176 Swing pricing’s positive ef-
fects may be the carrot that the mutual fund industry needs 
in order to undertake the operational and organizational 
changes necessary to implement swing pricing. Recall that 
swing pricing is optional, meaning that funds will only partic-
ipate if it makes economic sense to do so.  
 
that comes with swing pricing is sourced from, and equally offset by, the net 
transaction costs paid by buyers and sellers of fund shares each day that 
swing pricing is in effect. After expenses, swing pricing actually reduces ag-
gregate shareholder returns by the amount of fund expenses incurred to 
implement the fund’s swing pricing program.” Id. 
173 ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 6. 
174 Id. 
175 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62369. See also Final 
Rules supra note 4, at 82126. The authors question this logic and ask which 
investors they are referring to. Individual retirement investors are unlikely 
to understand swing pricing or seek it out, which leaves sophisticated in-
vestors to do so. Many retirement investors invest through employer-spon-
sored plans where investment professionals select and monitor the plan’s 
menu of investment options. The persistence of high-fee funds and potential 
conflicts of interest through revenue sharing are common criticisms of the 
effectiveness of the professional investment services provided to 401K in-
vestors. See e.g., Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Per-
vasive Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 
124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1487–91 (2015). 
176 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82126. 
TUCKER_VANDENTOORN_FINAL  
168 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
Swing pricing may also deter short-term trading and pos-
sible market-timing or arbitrage.177 Imposing liquidity trans-
action costs on triggering shareholders increases the price at 
which one can earn a short-term sale profit, and therefore in-
creases the risks of short-term trading. The 2015 ALFI Guide-
lines note that a shareholder’s investment will likely need to 
increase by at least double the value of the swing factor in or-
der to recoup costs and realize a gain.178 Swing pricing deter-
rence would work on top of existing anti-market-timing tools 
that funds independently possess, permitting restrictions on 
market-timing shareholders.179 Mutual funds’ use of existing 
market-timing tools180 mitigates deterrence benefits gained 




179 Market-Timing Rule, 17 C.F.R § 270.22c-2. The SEC began to re-
quire disclosure in a fund’s prospectus regarding the risks of frequent pur-
chases and redemptions of fund shares, including the risk of dilution and 
the increased trading and administrative costs. As a result of these risks, 
the SEC also required a fund to disclose its policies and procedures designed 
to deter frequent trading, including the specific restrictions such as the 
number of “round trips” (in and out = 1 round trip), minimum holding peri-
ods, redemption fees, or other restrictions a fund may have on purchases 
and redemptions. Funds may also impose restrictions on individual share-
holders who may be deemed to be disruptive shareholders based on their 
transaction history and the circumstances surrounding the transactions. 
Disclosure Regarding Market Timing, 69 Fed. Reg. 22300 (Apr. 23, 2004) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 274) [hereinafter Market Timing Disclosure 
Rule]. 
180 Each fund is required to disclose whether the fund’s board of direc-
tors has adopted a frequent trading policy and procedures; or, if not, the 
specific basis for the board’s determination that it does not need such policy 
and procedures. The vast majority of fund boards have adopted a frequent 
trading policy and procedure, which it can define as it sees fit. Funds must 
disclose any restrictions or limitations it may impose on shareholders 
deemed to be “frequent traders.” For example, a fund may choose a policy 
that prohibits a shareholder from purchasing a fund within thirty days after 
the shareholder sells the fund. Funds must also disclose any fees imposed 
to shareholders deemed to be frequent traders. Market Timing Disclosure 
Rule, supra note 179, at 22302. 
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In times of liquidity stress, mutual fund shareholders may 
perceive a first-mover advantage181 in racing to redeem their 
mutual fund shares at a declining, but not bottom, price.182 
Redemptions motivated by concerns about a tanking fund 
price can generate significant outflows, exacerbating the price 
declines and creating a mutual fund run. A fund experiencing 
large outflows “may be exposed to predatory trading activity 
in the securities it holds.”183 Shareholders remaining in the 
fund suffer the consequences of these actions—namely a “ma-
terial dilution” of the fund’s’ assets.184 Existing redemption 
fees may stem first-mover advantage concerns, and swing 
pricing would add additional deterrence.185 The SEC de-
scribed the intended disincentive as: 
[I]f non-transacting shareholders understood that re-
deeming shareholders—especially shareholders seek-
ing to redeem large holdings—would bear the esti-
mated costs of their redemption activity, it would 
reduce shareholders’ incentive to redeem large hold-
ings quickly because there would be less risk that non-
transacting shareholders would bear the costs of other 
shareholders’ redemption activity.186 
The absence of a minimum swing pricing threshold under 
the rules further discourages a first-mover advantage.187  
 
181 The first mover advantage identifies the incentive to sell before the 
transaction costs of a large redemption are incurred. A shareholder not per-
sonally interested in selling shares may decide to do so if they perceive that 
other, especially large, shareholders will redeem their shares. The incentive 
to be the first, if shared among a large group of shareholders, can create a 
run on a fund, which accelerates the negative pricing pressures that funds 
may experience when they need to meet large redemption orders. See Final 
Rules, supra note 4, at 82091. 
182 Id. at 82086. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 82091. Cf. Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 170, at 
9 (arguing that an undisclosed swing factor and threshold cannot meaning-
fully influence shareholder behavior). 
186 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82091. 
187 Id. at 82091, 82096–97. “Swing pricing provides funds with an ad-
ditional tool to pass estimated near-term costs stemming from shareholder 
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An equalization rationale or level mutual fund playing 
field may be a silent or unacknowledged force behind the 
swing pricing rules.188 Mutual funds currently enjoy popular 
and policy prominence in retirement savings. Mutual funds 
are a key design component of individual investors’ financial 
stability and in American retirement policy. Perceived, and 
documented, inequities in the system are undesirable, partic-
ularly those without a market solution that extract costs from 
long-term retirement investors. Mutual fund inattention to 
disparities may create a public relations crisis, if not a regu-
latory one, in the future—the kind that leads to severe inter-
vention or more restrictive regulation, in addition to public 
backlash. The optional swing pricing rules may be an oppor-
tunity for mutual funds to address these inequities on mostly 
their own terms and timetable without more onerous SEC in-
tervention. While not explicitly stated in any of the comments 
or the SEC’s preamble to the swing pricing rules, the equali-
zation and public opinion rationales may be driving forces be-
hind the rules. 
B. Swing Pricing Obstacles 
Challenges litter the path to achieving the promised bene-
fits of swing pricing described above, and they are catalogued 
in this Subsection. These challenges may be thought of as op-
erational and conceptual in origin. The operational challenges 
 
purchase or redemption activity on to the shareholders associated with that 
activity, and could therefore lessen dilution of non-transacting shareholders 
and limit any possible redemptions motivated by a potential first-mover ad-
vantage.” Id. at 82121. 
188 Consider, for example, the text accompanying the swing pricing 
rules:  
In order to effectively mitigate possible dilution arising in 
connection with shareholder purchase and redemption ac-
tivity, a fund’s swing threshold should generally reflect the 
estimated point at which net purchases or net redemptions 
would trigger the fund’s investment adviser to trade portfo-
lio assets in the near term, to a degree or of a type that may 
generate material liquidity or transaction costs for the fund. 
Id. at 82096. 
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relate to fund data, the mechanics of the mutual fund market, 
and funds’ risk in cost estimates without a safe harbor. Con-
ceptually, swing pricing rules raise concerns about price vola-
tility, imperfect equalization among mutual fund sharehold-
ers, and compliance costs and priority. Conceptual criticisms 
would persist even after a mutual fund industry operations 
adjustment to implement swing pricing. Part VI evaluates the 
relative impediments posed by these challenges from both ac-
ademic and industry perspectives. 
1. Operational Challenges 
BlackRock and Vanguard, two of the largest U.S. mutual 
funds, expressed support for swing pricing as an option to mit-
igate shareholder dilution while simultaneously cautioning 
that the U.S. mutual fund industry does not have the pricing 
and data capabilities to successfully implement it.189 A seem-
ingly insurmountable time conflict exists for mutual funds un-
der current procedures. Funds receive the information needed 
to trigger swing pricing late in the day, but must report either 
a standard or swung NAV early in the day. This time conflict 
creates a scenario where funds may end up electing to swing 
the fund with incomplete information—aptly called blind 
swinging—and must do so without a liability shield. The mu-
tual fund industry is understandably nervous about these cru-
cial operational questions because any change to operating 
procedures will affect mutual funds and the intermediaries 
that service them. In short, operational changes are necessary 
 
189 BlackRock and Vanguard, large institutional players in the mutual 
fund industry, express support for swing pricing as well as concerns regard-
ing the current operational viability of swing pricing in the United States, 
stating that the SEC should delay the rule or assist in facilitating industry 
change that would be necessary to implement swing pricing. See Barbara 
Novick & Benjamin Archibald, BlackRock, Comment Letter on Swing Pric-
ing, at 7 (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-
36.pdf [perma.cc/X2KY-HWH7]; see also Mortimer J. Buckley, Vanguard, 
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to implement swing pricing, and those changes will be time-
consuming, costly, and difficult. 
a. Mutual Fund Data & Market Timing 
The timing of U.S. mutual fund operations creates a “blind” 
swing pricing implementation where funds must declare the 
trading threshold met without complete trading information. 
Twenty SEC comments discussed these data timing chal-
lenges, approximately forty-two percent of the comments re-
ceived.190 Several industry commentators decried the existing 
operational feasibility in the mutual fund industry, and its re-
liance on intermediaries, to support swing pricing.191  
Consider first that U.S. mutual funds strike the daily NAV 
shortly after the trading deadline of 4:00 pm (eastern stand-
ard time zone), the time by which most funds receive their 
purchase and redemption orders.192 Funds would swing the 
daily NAV price, if appropriate, by adjusting it per the swing 
factor for liquidity costs due to trading volumes. Broker-deal-
ers and other intermediaries like retirement accounts, how-
ever, are permitted to transmit orders to funds after the 4:00 
pm deadline and after the NAV price is struck.193 The 4:00 pm 
trading deadline applies to intermediaries, who may receive a 
 
190 See e.g., Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9, at 21 (discuss-
ing the operational challenges of the “arbitrary time intervals” in the pro-
posed rules); see also supra Figure 1. For a complete list of comments on the 
Proposed Rule: Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; 
Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of Comment Period for Investment Company 
Reporting Modernization Release, visit https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
16-15/s71615.shtml [perma.cc/AYQ5-JNGA]. 
191 See, e.g., Marc R. Bryant, Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., Comment 
Letter on Swing Pricing, at 11 (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-16-15/s71615-45.pdf [perma.cc/Z8LJ-SK33] (cautioning that “the 
existing operational systems supporting the mutual fund industry will not 
support effective swing pricing”). 
192 Id. at 11–12. See also Timothy W. Cameron & Lindsey Weber Keljo, 
Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Comment Letter on Swing Pricing (Jan. 
13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-65.pdf [perma.cc/ 
UB97-PPY9] (setting out in detail the timing of receipt of fund flow infor-
mation to U.S. mutual funds). 
193 Vanguard Comment Letter, supra note 189, at 17 n.47. 
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purchase or sale order from individual investors through the 
close of trading. Intermediaries need time to aggregate and 
transmit the buy and sell orders to the respective funds, which 
happens after the 4:00 pm trading deadline, and processing 
occurs throughout the night.194 
Mutual funds strike the NAV between 6:00–8:00 pm, and 
often without complete purchase order information.195 
While broker-dealer intermediaries may accept orders 
until 4:00 pm, these intermediaries do not transmit 
the orders to the fund company until after 4:00 pm. In 
the U.S., a significant percentage of shareholder 
transactions through intermediaries are not transmit-
ted to the fund company until after the fund’s NAV is 
calculated. The primary mechanism for these interme-
diaries to submit trades is through the National Secu-
rities Clearing Corporation, which allows intermedi-
aries to transmit the amount of shares until 8:30 pm 
for orders that met the proper order cutoff of 4:00 
pm.196  
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Associa-
tion (“SIFMA”) reports that an estimated eighty percent of 
shareholders do not invest directly with a fund, but rather 
through a financial intermediary such as a retirement plan.197 
Most funds, SIMA cautioned, will not “have sufficient infor-
mation about fund flows at the time the NAV is struck to de-
termine whether the swing threshold has been breached and 
thus the NAV should be adjusted.”198 Certain intermediaries, 
such as retirement plans and insurance companies, may re-
quire the NAV before processing fund trading thus further ex-
 
194 Id. See also INV. CO. INST., EVALUATING SWING PRICING: OPERA-
TIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 6 (2016), https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_16_evaluat-
ing_swing_pricing.pdf [perma.cc/SY32-JW29] [hereinafter INV. CO. INST. 
CONSIDERATIONS]. 
195 Vanguard Comment Letter, supra note 189, at 17 n.47. See also INV. 
CO. INST. CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 194, at 6. 
196 Fidelity Comment Letter, supra note 191, at 12. 
197 Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, supra note 192, at 15–16. 
198 Id. at 3. 
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tending the time for funds to receive complete trading infor-
mation and complicating the information loop needed to im-
plement swing pricing accurately.199 
Under swing pricing rules, a fund must evaluate net share-
holder activity to determine if the swing threshold has been 
met before the NAV is struck.200 The most crucial component 
of the swing pricing framework is whether the swing thresh-
old has been met or not. Estimating a swing threshold for pur-
poses of adjusting—or swinging—the NAV shortly after the 
4:00 pm deadline, and without complete trading information, 
creates an operational impediment and forces “blind” swing-
ing by participating funds.201 One industry commentator sum-
marized the “conflicting requirements”: 
Established workflows provide for the broker-dealers, 
bank trust departments, retirement recordkeepers 
and other intermediaries that process the vast major-
ity of mutual fund purchases and redemptions to use 
the current transaction price as an input in their daily 
processing. Among other considerations, intermediar-
ies require receipt of the current transaction price to 
translate the value of customer orders expressed in 
share amounts or as percentages of holdings into dol-
lar amounts. So long as fund transaction processors 
and distribution intermediaries require a fund’s price 
as an input into their processes for determining the 
value of daily net fund flows, the swing pricing re-
quirement that a reliable estimate of daily net flows is 
available at the time the daily transaction price is es-
tablished cannot be fulfilled.202  
 
199 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82100–01. 
200 Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9, at 55–56, 59–60. 
201 Dechert LLP, Comment Letter on Swing Pricing, at 20 (Jan. 13, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-70.pdf [perma.cc/ 
2M5T-367H] (“Given that the successful implementation of swing pricing 
depends heavily on a fund’s receipt of timely and reasonably accurate cash 
flow estimates, to the extent that current trade processing systems and 
practices limit the ability of funds to receive intraday order flow infor-
mation, it will be very difficult to develop a workable swing pricing re-
gime.”). 
202 Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 170, at 5. 
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The rules force a seemingly impossible set of operations by 
on participating funds.203 First, it requires the nearly instan-
taneous processing and collection of all trading activity from 
a variety of sources, including intermediaries. Second, it re-
quires an instantaneous and simultaneous assessment of 
trading activity to determine if the threshold is met. The rules 
require a third immediate and simultaneous action: assessing 
the trading costs and setting the swing factor. Between 4:00 
pm and 6:00 pm, participating funds must complete trading, 
garner it from a variety of sources, evaluate trading volumes 
and costs, and issue an adjusted NAV.204 Layered service pro-
viders within the mutual fund industry serve as consolidation 
clearing houses for other mutual fund platforms. These inter-
mediaries rely upon the technology of those other service pro-
viders (i.e., broker-dealers and retirement platforms) to incor-
porate the trading data for the day from the underlying 
intermediaries in order to generate a consolidated purchase 
and redemption order.205 Transactions within retirement ac-
counts must also be verified for compliance with retirement 
savings rules, adding an additional transactional layer and 
delay between trading close, transmission, and incorporation 
into the fund’s NAV.206  
 
203 Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, supra note 197, at 15–16 (setting 
out in detail the timing of receipt of fund flow information to U.S. mutual 
funds). 
204 Contrast the U.S. operations with those of European jurisdictions, 
where mutual funds receive complete trade information by noon each day. 
European funds have up to seven hours to assess shareholder trade infor-
mation as well as portfolio trading needs and related costs. Inv. Co. Inst. 
Comment Letter, supra note 9, at D-1 to D-3. The current NAV calculation 
process, however, requires subjective judgments and estimates such as val-
uations for standardized market pricing. See Final Rules, supra note 4, at 
82093 (“We note that current NAV calculation processes already include 
subjective judgments and estimates, including, for example, fair-value de-
terminations for assets that lack readily available market quotations.”). 
205 Inv. Co. Inst. Considerations, supra note 194, at 6–7. 
206 Id. See also Interview with Holly van den Toorn, Legal and Compli-
ance Manager, in Atlanta, Ga. (2017). Holly van den Toorn also noted addi-
tional operational challenges regarding fund flow estimation such as 
whether dividend reinvestments, automatic investment plans, or manda-
tory minimum withdrawals should be included in the transactions to which 
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FIGURE 2: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTERMEDIARIES, RE-
TIREMENT INVESTORS, AND MUTUAL FUNDS 
 At step 1, intermediaries collect trades. At step 2, interme-
diaries collate trades.207 At step 3, intermediaries transmit 
 
the swing factor must be applied. As a practical matter, the operational dif-
ficulty of achieving the exclusion of such transactions from an adjusted NAV 
may not even be possible at this time. 
207 Each intermediary collects trades from underlying shareholders 
and sends them through “omnibus accounts” (as one big group trade) to the 
fund’s transfer agent. These trades are collected by intermediaries through-
out the day up until the 4:00 p.m. cut-off time mandated by the SEC. It could 
still take the intermediary until 6:00 p.m. or later, or even overnight, to 
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trades to mutual fund.208 Finally, at step 4, the mutual fund 
manages inflows (asset purchases) and redemptions (asset 
sales).209 
b. No Safe Harbor 
Unlike in European jurisdictions,210 the U.S. swing pricing 
rules do not create a safe harbor to protect a fund’s miscalcu-
lation of the swing threshold based upon reasonable esti-
mates.211 Mutual fund insiders, including one author, are con-
cerned that the operational impossibility will breed a 
situation ripe for mutual fund shareholder lawsuits and en-
forcement actions.212 David Blass, the General Counsel of the 
Investment Company Institute (the “ICI”), summarized the 
concern as “[s]wing pricing would introduce a new potential 
source of pricing error” because a fund may well be using es-
timated flow information, and if materially inaccurate, cause 
the fund to materially misstate its NAV.213 Incorrect estima-
tions of the swing factor may trigger a fund’s price or NAV 
 
208 Direct Shareholders are shareholders whose accounts are directly 
on the fund’s transfer agent system and don’t go through an intermediary. 
209 The transfer agent processes all trades and tells the fund how much 
cash it needs to make available for redemptions, or how much it has to in-
vest. Shareholder trades can be T+1 or T+3, so funds may have advanced 
notice of large trades. The information is sent to the fund’s accounting agent 
who sends a “cash sheet” or “super sheet” to the portfolio manager/team who 
will then adjust the portfolio as needed. 
210 The ALFI Swing Pricing Guidelines provide: “If acting in good faith, 
the fund is swung based on a flow estimate which is subsequently found to 
be inaccurate, this in itself would not normally be considered an error if the 
fund’s standard and appropriate policies and procedures have been fol-
lowed.” ALFI 2015 GUIDELINES, supra note 58, at 30. 
211 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82100 n.189. See also Swing Pricing 
First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62340. 
212 Dechert, supra note 201, at 24 (“[T]he Commission could expressly 
provide that the relevant parties, including the fund, the swing pricing ad-
ministrator and the fund board, would not be exposed to liability for NAV 
errors of this type if there were adequate guardrails in place and reasonable 
measures were taken to implement swing pricing.”). 
213 Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9, at 62. 
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correction policies.214 Funds’ NAV correction policies typically 
provide for a fund to correct a material NAV error and require 
a fund’s investment advisor to reimburse shareholders suffer-
ing “material economic loss due to the errors.”215 NAV mis-
statements would require reprocessing all shareholders af-
fected by the inaccurate NAV; a significant burden would 
thereby be placed on funds and their service providers.216 
Rather than create a safe harbor, the rules rely on a rea-
sonable estimate of fund flows after a reasonable inquiry.217 
The swing pricing policies and procedures required under the 
rules should outline flow estimate procedures.218 What consti-
tutes a reasonable estimate will vary depending on the fund 
and the trading circumstances.219 For example, a fund with 
consistent redemption levels and a large, direct shareholder 
base (as opposed to retirement plan investors) may be “better 
positioned to make a high confidence estimate of flows with 
less effort, than a fund that is primarily distributed through 
intermediaries, who has experienced volatile purchases and 
redemptions and has a mix of distribution partners and insti-
tutional and retail shareholders.”220 The SEC also encouraged 
 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 61–62. 
216 Id. at 62. 
217 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82099 (discussing price and swing 
threshold estimates). Cf. Invesco, supra note 98, at 6 (urging the SEC to 
create a “safe harbor for good faith decisions and actions that shield funds 
from potential liability”). 
218 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82100 (“Such policies and procedures 
could describe the process by which the fund obtains shareholder flow infor-
mation—including flows obtained from intermediaries—as well as the 
amount and kind of transaction data that the fund believes necessary to 
obtain before making its estimate of total net flows in order to determine 
whether the swing threshold has been exceeded, and applying swing pricing 
that day.”). 
219 Id. at 82100 (“We recognize that funds may take different ap-
proaches in determining whether they have sufficient flow data to make a 
reasonable high confidence estimate, and that the completeness of data—
such as the percentage of actual versus estimated net flow data—as well as 
the nature and types of estimates used may vary based on the particular 
circumstances of the fund.”). 
220 Id. 
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funds, consistent with European practices, to regularly back-
test fund flow-estimating procedures with actual data to con-
firm and refine the estimating procedures.221 
c. Fund Size Matters 
Large-fund-complex advantages and restricted fund op-
tions are two possible side effects of the intermediary/mutual 
fund-timing problem. Under the first—large fund complex ad-
vantages—the concern is that larger funds can exert more 
pressure to get their orders processed first by their distribu-
tion partners thus improving their information and reducing 
operational friction.222 This is the mutual fund “Wal-Mart” ad-
vantage where the largest provider garners the most supply 
chain support and priority, reinforcing its superiority over 
smaller offerings. The second concern reflects a practical real-
ity that intermediaries may choose to protect themselves from 
the timing pressures exacerbated by swing pricing and ex-
clude participating funds from the platform.223 There are 
thousands of mutual funds, and the idea is that if intermedi-
aries find compliance to be a hassle, they will opt for funds 
without swing pricing. 
The diversity of the mutual fund industry—there were 
over 9500 mutual funds in the United States in 2016224—en-
sures that there will be early adopters in the market to utilize 
 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 82101–02. See generally Inv. Co. Inst. Considerations, supra 
note 194, at 5–7. 
223 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82101 (“In addition, funds also ex-
pressed concerns that intermediaries may choose not to offer funds that 
choose to implement swing pricing, due to the increased processing and 
technology burdens that swing pricing would impose on intermediaries, a 
consideration that funds will evaluate as they determine whether to adopt 
swing pricing.”). 
224 Number of Mutual Funds in the United States from 1997 to 2016, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/255590/number-of-mutual-
fund-companies-in-the-united-states/ [perma.cc/7UGG-AZE4]. See also Dis-
tribution of Investment Fund Assets in the United States in 2016, by Type, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/255606/asset-allocation-mu-
tual-funds-usa/) [perma.cc/2KER-EPPM] (displaying that of these funds, as-
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swing pricing with distribution models and an investor base 
better able to accommodate the information challenges of 
swing pricing.225 These early adopters, including larger fund 
complexes, may drive industry changes through the market, 
rather than through an SEC mandate. Additionally, the ex-
tended implementation time for the optional rules further al-
low early adopters to drive market changes necessary for 
broader participation.226 
d. A Possible Path Forward: Block Chain 
Technology 
Blockchain227 is one implementation strategy for swing 
pricing in the U.S. mutual fund industry. Simply described, 
blockchain technology facilitates a large, virtual, secure, dis-
tributed, and nearly automatic public ledger.228 Blockchain 
 
sets were distributed roughly 42% in domestic equity funds, 14% in inter-
national equity funds, 22% in bond funds, 14% in money market funds, and 
8% in hybrid funds like ETFs and alternative funds). 
225 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82101–02. The SEC also said it: 
[U]nderstand[s] that certain funds with investors that pri-
marily transact directly with the fund’s principal under-
writer or transfer agent, or that are primarily distributed 
through affiliates or broker-dealers (that could potentially 
provide timely flow data), and/or do not have a substantial 
number of investors transacting in retirement plans or in-
surance products could more easily obtain sufficient net flow 
information. In addition, larger fund complexes with the 
ability to more easily get net flow information from their in-
termediaries, including those that have established large 
trade notification processes, may have the leverage to nego-
tiate operational solutions and the resources to implement 
swing pricing sooner for certain funds, which may result in 
inefficient one-off solutions rather than coordinated indus-
try-wide operational solutions that may reduce costs for in-
vestors overall. 
Id. 
226 See id. at 82101–03. 
227 See generally SHAWN S. AMUIAL ET AL., THE BLOCKCHAIN: A GUIDE 
FOR LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS (2016). 
228 See Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment 
Funds 5–7 (Univ. of St. Thomas, Minn. Legal Studies, Research Paper 
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can deliver both speed and accuracy. Blockchain technology 
records peer-to-peer transactions in real time reducing (if not 
eliminating) the role of intermediaries.229 It also reduces the 
need for operational intermediaries—a significant obstacle to 
swing pricing implementation discussed above—and speeds 
up fund flow information.230  
Another key feature of blockchain technology is its immu-
tability; it is designed to eliminate fraudulent transactions 
through decentralization and verification.231 Multiple parties 
can access and contribute to a blockchain ledger, and parties 
must provide digital signatures to authenticate their iden-
tity.232 To simply illustrate, each transaction creates a new 
block in the chain, and as transactions continue, the chain 
grows from 1 to 2, to 5, to 10, and so on. If multiple parties 
have access to the verified chain, a single party cannot alter 
 
No.17-21, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2998033 [perma.cc/442Y-GFSJ] (describing key attributes of blockchain 
technology). 
229 Id. at 5. 
230 See AMUIAL ET AL., supra note 227 (arguing that blockchain “incen-
tivizes direct peer-to-peer transactions, including compensation, between 
the creator and consumer, eliminating the need for intermediation. Inter-
mediaries . . . are replaced by code, connectivity, crowd, and collaboration. 
Blockchain . . . creates a platform for trust through truth and transparency 
for parties through its immutability and use of cryptography.”). See also 
Kaal, supra note 228, at 5 (stating that transaction costs will be reduced by 
the elimination of intermediaries). 
231 Rik Kirkland, How Blockchains Could Change the World: Interview 
with Don Tapscott, MCKINSEY & CO. HIGH TECH (May 2016), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/how-block-
chains-could-change-the-world [perma.cc/533A-ZM2B]. 
232 Kaal, supra note 228, at 8 (arguing that cryptographic technology 
enhances the security of the blockchain by embedding information from all 
prior transactions through algorithm-generated unique hash values before 
adding the next transaction, or block. . . .). See also id. at 8. (“That hash 
value ensures the authenticity of each transaction before it is added to the 
block. The smallest change to the blockchain, even a single digit/value, re-
sults in a different hash value. A different hash value makes any form of 
manipulation immediately detectable.”). 
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the established chain across all of the copies, making it “prac-
tically impossible to reverse, alter, or erase information in the 
blockchain.”233  
Leveraging blockchain technologies in mutual fund trans-
actions would facilitate a fund closing its fund flow by the cur-
rent 4:00 pm deadline with a verified and secure ledger in 
place.234 A fund could reliably calculate its NAV by 6:00 pm 
EST, with swing adjustments, if needed. This breakthrough 
technology seems particularly hopeful for an industry that 
still relies on paper and faxed orders to some extent.235 The 
current process of transaction settlement can take as long as 
a week because intermediaries guarantee assets and institu-
tional pass records, and individually verify them.236 Block-
chain promises settlement of transactions “within seconds, se-
curely and verifiably.”237  
The capital markets and investment management indus-
tries are currently working on advancements in blockchain, 
with the hope that future fund distribution can be made auto-
matic and instantaneous. Nasdaq Inc., for example, is collab-
orating with Nordic financial services group SEB to test a 
small-scale mutual fund trading platform based on blockchain 
technology.238 Calastone, a technology company, said in June 
2017 that it had successfully transacted mutual fund trades 
in a test environment and believes that blockchain could rev-
 
233 Id. at 7. 
234 See e.g., Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Block-
chain, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 118, https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-
truth-about-blockchain [perma.cc/V8EA-U4SG]. 
235 Attracta Mooney, Blockchain Successfully Tested in Sale of Mutual 
Funds, FIN. TIMES (June 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/5927fa2c-
4c73-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b. 
236 Iansiti & Lakhani, supra note 234, at 6. 
237 Id. 
238 Anna Irrera, Nasdaq, SEB to Test Blockchain for Mutual Funds, 
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olutionize the mutual fund industry with significant efficien-
cies.239 Additionally, on August 1, 2017, new Delaware legis-
lation authorized Delaware corporations—a jurisdictional 
home of a majority of Fortune 500 companies—to use block-
chain technology for stock ledgers and other corporate rec-
ords.240 Early adopters of blockchain-based stock ledgers and 
records include private companies in Delaware,241 and a broad 
range of private investment firms.242 
Widespread blockchain adoption in issuing companies and 
funds is not yet realized. Adoption obstacles include data pri-
vacy for public blockchains,243 the novelty of the field,244 re-
sistance due to pressure on fee structure and the elimination 
of intermediary roles,245 and untested regulatory compliance. 
Additionally, within the mutual fund industry, a crucial step 
will be for large firms to convince major industry participants 
to use the same platform.246 Analysis of technology adoption 
and infiltration performed by two Harvard Business School 
professors, Marco Iansiti and Karim R. Lakhani, however, 
 
239 Mooney, supra note 235, at 1. 
240 81 Del. Laws Ch. 86 (2017). See also Jeff John Roberts, Companies 
Can Put Shareholders on a Blockchain Starting Today, FORTUNE (Aug. 1, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/01/blockchain-shareholders-law/ [https:// 
perma.cc/E9RH-YMUE]. 
241 Sara Merken, Delaware Blockchain Move Drawing in Private Com-
panies, Law Firms, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.bna.com/delaware-blockchain-move-n73014463104/ [https:// 
perma.cc/A33Y-M59Z] (citing to two dozen private firms interested in block-
chain stock ledgers). 
242 Kaal supra note 228, at 19, 28 (listing 120 private investment firms 
utilizing blockchain and specific applications). 
243 Alison Berke, How Safe Are Blockchains? It Depends, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (March 7, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/how-safe-are-blockchains-it-
depends [perma.cc/G57H-C37G] (describing public and private blockchain 
technology and noting that the financial industry relies upon private block-
chains). 
244 Kirkland, supra note 231 (“The biggest problems [with blockchain] 
have to do with governance. Any controversy . . . is going to revolve around 
these governance issues. This new community is in its infancy . . .[,] the 
whole world of blockchain and digital currencies is the Wild West.”). 
245 Kaal, supra note 228, at 23–25. 
246 Mooney, supra note 235, at 2. 
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suggests that early and strong areas of blockchain growth will 
occur in localized applications within a small network of fi-
nancial firms.247 They predict early and important adoption of 
private blockchains in the financial industry, including the 
firms listed above and among others, which will drive further 
applications and adoptions.248  
While not fully realized, the authors of this Article are ex-
cited about the potential for blockchain technology to address 
the operational hurdles to swing pricing—as well as to deliver 
transaction cost savings through automation, accuracy, and 
intermediary elimination. 
2. Conceptual Challenges 
This Article distinguishes conceptual challenges from op-
erational challenges because the conceptual criticisms persist 
even if the mutual fund industry implemented the operational 
changes addressed above. Price volatility and arbitrage, im-
perfect equalization among mutual fund shareholders, and 
rising compliance costs with competing compliance priorities 
are all conceptual challenges to swing pricing.  
a. Volatility & Arbitrage 
Swing pricing may be a source of, not a solution to, volatil-
ity, at least in the short term.249 A mutual fund opting into 
swing pricing is likely to experience greater price volatility 
(variations) when the NAV swings than when it does not.250 
 
247 Iansiti & Lakhani, supra note 234, at 8. 
248 Id. 
249 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82092. (“[A] few [commentators] op-
posed swing pricing outright, arguing that it may have negative effects on 
certain shareholders and may add to fund performance volatility.”). 
250 Id. at 82093 (“Swing pricing could increase the volatility of a fund’s 
NAV in the short-term because NAV adjustments would occur when the 
fund’s net purchases or net redemptions pass the fund’s swing threshold. 
Thus, the fund’s day-to-day NAV would show greater fluctuation than 
would be the case in the absence of swing pricing.”). See also Dechert Com-
ment Letter, supra note 201, at 24 (pointing out that price volatility may 
originate from “(i) the application of an incorrect swing factor to a fund’s 
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Increased price variations might correlate with higher short-
term tracking errors where the fund’s return on the swung 
NAV deviates from a fund’s benchmark return.251 One mutual 
fund industry commentator cautioned:  
Swing pricing will distort the comparative perfor-
mance records of different funds to reward those that 
apply swing pricing most aggressively. The difficult-
to-quantify and variable nature of the underlying fund 
costs that the Swing Pricing Proposal seeks to miti-
gate and the forced reliance on estimates of daily net 
flows mean that fund transaction prices adjusted to 
reflect swing pricing will be subject to errors and sec-
ond-guessing, exposing funds utilizing swing pricing 
to transaction reprocessing costs and potential regula-
tory sanctions and litigation.252  
These concerns are short-sighted however, because while 
daily variation may increase, the price would reflect actual 
transaction costs making the returns more accurate. Addition-
ally, as more funds implement swing pricing, the benchmarks 
will reflect the liquidity costs, and over time, produce both 
more accurate and consistent returns.253  
 
NAV; (ii) adjusting the fund’s NAV in the wrong direction; and (iii) the fail-
ure to adjust the fund’s NAV when the swing threshold has been reached”). 
251 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82093 (“[V]olatility might increase 
short-term tracking error (i.e., the difference in return based on the swung 
NAV compared to the fund’s benchmark) during the daily period of NAV 
adjustment, and could make a fund’s short-term performance deviate from 
the fund’s benchmark to a greater degree than if swing pricing had not been 
used, especially if the NAV is swung on the first or last day of a performance 
measurement period.”). 
252 Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 170, at 4. 
253 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82093 (“[S]wing pricing may also result 
in reduced tracking error over time, as benchmarks typically do not take 
into account transaction costs associated with responding to daily transac-
tions, and if swing pricing recoups such costs, it may result in a fund that 
implements swing pricing better matching its benchmark on a long-term 
basis.”). 
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The ICI, representing 9352 mutual funds,254 expressed 
concern that disclosures of swing pricing process and fund 
flow data would create new arbitrage opportunities by disclos-
ing heretofore “material non-public information.”255 The Eu-
ropean jurisdictions’ experience with swing pricing confirms 
these suspicions. Historically, European funds were reticent 
to disclose swing pricing information.256 Many European 
funds do not disclose the swing threshold—something not re-
quired under the U.S. rules—but roughly half of funds re-
sponding to a 2015 survey disclose swing pricing information 
upon client request.257  
New swing pricing procedures may contribute to short-
term price volatility by deterring advance notice of large 
trades. Large shareholders or institutional investors often 
provide funds advance notice of a large purchase or redemp-
tion order, as a courtesy.258 Discouraging advance notice aug-
ments a funds’ likelihood of “blind” NAV calculations. Funds 
foster strong relationships and communication with interme-
diaries and as a result are able to request advance notice of 
large shareholder transactions.259 Intermediaries may pro-
vide a few days’ to even a few weeks’ notice of large transac-
tions, such as when the fund is being added or removed from 
 
254 INV. CO. INST., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO MEMBERS 2 (2015), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/15_ici_annual.pdf [perma.cc/Z8WM-SLK8]. The as-
sociation that would later become the ICI was formed in 1940 in conjunction 
with the sweeping federal financial reform ushered in by the 1940 Invest-
ment Company Act. See also INV. CO. INST, ICI’s Mission, 
https://www.ici.org/about_ici/mission [perma.cc/BLD5-NPXF] (discussing 
ICI history further). 
255 Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9, at 56. Holly van den 
Toorn notes her conversations with traders discussing the arbitrage possi-
bilities that exist if a trader thinks that a fund’s price will be swung. 
256 ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 12. 
257 Id. 
258 Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9, at 56. See also Final 
Rules, supra note 4, at 82102 n.206 (discussing the advance notice of large 
trades negotiated by large fund complexes with their intermediaries as a 
way to avoid in-kind redemptions). 
259 Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9, at A-11. 
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an investment model, 401(k) plan options, or the intermedi-
ary’s platform of funds available to its customers.260 Funds 
are required to disclose  swing pricing practices in the prospec-
tus, thus cueing investors in to how their large transactions 
maybe be affected by a swung NAV.261 Wanting to avoid this 
effect, large institutional shareholders may alter its courtesy 
disclosure practice to circumvent a fund from triggering swing 
pricing on anticipated trading volume, when a day’s trading 
volume is high, but not yet over the swing threshold.  
As an example, a large institutional shareholder advises a 
fund that it intends to redeem $10 million from the fund two 
weeks in advance of the trade. Such a redemption would trig-
ger the fund’s swing threshold. Notice allows the fund’s port-
folio managers and traders to assess carefully the potential 
transaction and market impact costs in the days leading up to 
the redemption. On the day that a shareholder places a $10 
million redemption order, the fund adjusts the NAV to impose 
a fair representation of costs to the redeeming institutional 
shareholder, protecting the remaining shareholders from di-
lution. Under current mutual fund operations timing, a fund 
may swing the NAV without complete trading information. In 
such a scenario, advance notice to the fund may make it more 
likely that a fund will deem the swing threshold met and ad-
just the NAV. An institutional shareholder looking to game 
the system and avoid the allocation of transaction costs may 
choose not to provide advance notice.262  
 
260 Id. 
261 Final Rules supra note 4, at 82107 (stating disclosure require-
ments). 
262 An intermediary may feel compelled to consider its clients’ “best in-
terests” and may avoid presenting the fund with enough information and 
time to calculate properly the swing factor in hopes that the fund cannot 
accurately estimate transaction and market impact costs in its favor. Holly 
van den Toorn noted the general confusion and concern regarding the extent 
of the new fiduciary duty standards and whether the new standard would 
impose a theoretical obligation on an intermediary to avoid triggering the 
NAV. See also Retirement Conflict of Interest Final Rule, EMP. BENEFIT SEC. 
ADMIN., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-
regulations/completed-rulemaking/1210-AB32-2 [perma.cc/P5DJ-VRSE] 
(providing information on the Dept. of Labor’s Fiduciary Duty Rule, with an 
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In a paradoxical situation, participating funds may receive 
less advance notice of large trades and thus incur more mar-
ket impact costs in meeting large, and unpredictable, redemp-
tion demands. Additionally, participating funds may be 
forced—in the absence of advance notice—to account for 
transaction costs in an “imprecise” manner.263 Lack of proper 
notice and operational challenges to receiving accurate flow of 
information increase the likelihood that a fund will under- or 
over-estimate the swing factor and adjust the NAV improp-
erly, exposing remaining shareholders to dilution—at least at 
the beginning. There is an important counter-argument that 
bears noting here. If swing pricing ultimately improves fund 
performance by removing the performance drag of dilution 
from reported returns, larger reported investment returns 
should incentivize advance notice to funds in the long-run. 
b. Imperfect Equalization 
The swing pricing rules treat all active shareholders the 
same—meaning that regardless of the shareholder’s order 
size, a fund applies the same swung NAV price.264 A share-
holder redeeming or purchasing a relatively small number of 
mutual fund shares is paid (or pay) the same swung NAV as 
a shareholder with a large order. The inequity complaint 
arises because the active but small order shareholder is likely 
subsidizing some of the transaction costs generated by the ac-
tive and large order shareholder.265 Consider, for example, the 
retirement investor who is required, per IRS regulations, to 
make annual minimum distributions beginning at the age of 
 
effective date of January 1, 2018; however, there is uncertainty about im-
plementation due to a February 3, 2017 Executive Order signed by Presi-
dent Donald Trump ordering the DOL to reexamine the rule). See Exec. Or-
der No. 13,772, 82 F.R. 9965 (2017).  
263 Inv. Co. Inst. Comment Letter, supra note 9, at 57. 
264 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82094 (“[A]s the proposed swing pricing 
rules would apply a single adjusted NAV per share to all shareholder orders, 
regardless of order size.”). 
265 Id. at 82094 (“[S]wing pricing could thus penalize certain investors 
disproportionately or give other investors inappropriate ‘‘windfalls.’’). 
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70 ½.266 For example, if a fund adjusted its NAV by five basis 
points to reflect transaction liquidity costs generated by unu-
sually large trading that day, a shareholder redeeming 10 
shares is paid five basis points less per share than a share-
holder redeeming 10,000 shares, and who is also the likely 
source of the high liquidity transaction costs.267 Regulatory 
design requires a tradeoff between accuracy and administra-
bility that is evident in the swing pricing rules. There is in-
deed the potential for some imperfect cost allocation between 
active shareholders under the rules, but it is a more accurate 
allocation than between active and sedentary, or long-term, 
shareholders. Additionally, swing pricing administrator re-
ports, mutual fund director oversight, published swing pricing 
policies and procedures, a consistent (and undisclosed) swing 
threshold, and an upper limit (two percent) of swing pricing 
all further safeguard fair application of the rules.268  
Another inequity criticism highlights potential impact dif-
ferences on large versus small funds. In times of liquidity 
stress or crisis, some mutual fund industry representatives 
cautioned that investors will be more likely to redeem from 
funds without swing pricing, which are more likely to be 
smaller funds, thus concentrating run risks within smaller 
funds.269 They worry that swing pricing will “create incentives 
for investors to redeem from the funds least likely to be able 
to handle the stress from large amounts of redemptions. This 
result is both anti-competitive and—to the extent that the 
SEC is concerned about redemptions leading to ‘fire sales’—
counterproductive.”270 
 
266 Qualified Pension, Profit-sharing, and Stock Bonus Plans, 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.401(a)(9)(C) (2017). 
267 Coal. of Mutual Fund Inv’rs, Comment Letter on Swing Pricing 
(Jan. 18, 2016), at 8, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-85.pdf 
[perma.cc/A3BX-QLTC] (describing how the symmetry of the SEC rules dis-
advantage certain shareholders under swing pricing). 
268 See e.g., Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82094 (describing safeguards 
of fairness). 
269 Dechert Comment Letter, supra note 201, at 22. 
270 Id. 
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c. Compliance Costs & Priority 
Participating swing pricing funds face significant imple-
mentation costs. The SEC estimated swing pricing implemen-
tation costs at $1.3 million to $2.25 million per fund com-
plex.271 These optional implementation costs are on top of 
mutual fund compliance with other new regulations passed as 
part of a liquidity management package. The additional li-
quidity rules require liquidity risk management programs, a 
liquidity classification of each portfolio investment, redemp-
tion in-kind policies and procedures,272 and modernizing 
shareholder reporting forms.273 Additionally the mutual fund 
industry must also comply with the Department of Labor’s 
(“DOL”) new definition of who is a fiduciary—a seismic policy 
and operational shift for the industry.274  
 
271 Swing Pricing Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 62367–68. The 
SEC’s cost estimates do not account for industry retooling to provide earlier 
trade and fund flow information from intermediaries to funds. See e.g., 
Eaton Vance Comment Letter, supra note 170, at 5. 
272 Final Liquidity Risk Rules, supra note 4, at 82142. Most funds 
would be required to comply with the liquidity risk management program 
requirements by December 1, 2018, and smaller funds by June 1, 2019. Id. 
at 82228. 
273 SEC Report Modernization Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 200, 210, 232, 239, 240, 
249, 270, 274 (2017). 
274 DOL Fiduciary Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(j) (2017). The new rules 
and subsequent uncertainty has consumed significant resources in the mu-
tual fund industry. Holly van den Toorn notes the significant amount of 
time mutual fund complexes spent in advance of the rule compliance date 
working with intermediaries, many of which had different approaches to 
solving for the DOL Fiduciary Rule. Amidst the post-election uncertainty, 
some complexes launched a specific share class to accommodate intermedi-
aries’ compliance, but are not currently offering the special share class until 
the Rule’s future becomes clear. She also reports that the overall mutual 
fund industry would prefer to see a fiduciary standard produced in conjunc-
tion with their primary regulator, the SEC, to avoid future conflicts. Anne 
Tucker, the author with primary academic experience, acknowledges the 
operational and market consolidation changes are likely to follow imple-
mentation of the fiduciary duty rule. From her perspective, the painful ele-
ments of these changes should never have been permitted in the first place. 
Self-interestedly promoting high-fee, low-return products—or even medio-
cre products—to unsophisticated clients exploits information asymmetries 
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Smaller mutual fund complexes that may have exhausted 
time and money resources on the mandatory rules are less 
likely to implement swing pricing because of the additional 
and optional regulatory compliance and cost burdens that 
come with the practice. In this way, the rules preference 
larger fund complexes with greater resources and operational 
efficiencies in implementing new systems.275 
V. MUTUAL FUND LIQUIDITY: EXISTING AND 
CONSIDERED TOOLS TO RECOUP & REDUCE 
COSTS 
Alternatives to swing pricing include redemption fees, in-
kind redemptions, and dual pricing. As the mutual fund mar-
ket grew, SEC regulations authorized various anti-dilution 
and other tools to promote mutual fund liquidity. U.S. mutual 
funds can impose redemption fees and in-kind redemptions as 
anti-dilution tools. A third tool—dual pricing—which is not 
authorized for U.S. mutual funds, is also introduced below. 
Each of these alternatives provides an important regulatory 
juxtaposition to swing pricing and contextualizes the discus-
sion undertaken in this Article. Neither author is convinced 
that the existing alternatives provide a workable option for 
 
and trust misplaced on the veneer of professionalism in the form of nice 
suits and glossy product brochures. High-fee, low-performance investment 
options create market inefficiencies, erode individual investors’ retirement 
accounts, and contribute to a national savings shortfall. For a similar view, 
see Benjamin P. Edwards, A Rules Change from Trump Means More Money 




275 Dechert Comment Letter, supra note 201, at 20 (“For example, 
smaller fund complexes are less likely than larger fund complexes to have 
adequate resources or internal processes in place to be able to support the 
use of swing pricing. In addition, as the timeliness and accuracy of intraday 
flow information to a fund depends on the intermediaries through which the 
fund distributes its shares, certain funds may benefit more than others to 
the extent they use intermediaries that have developed systems to address 
the operational concerns associated with swing pricing or have large num-
bers of direct shareholders.”). 
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funds to effectively manage liquidity and mitigate dilution for 
a wide-ranging set of assets or circumstances. Funds cannot 
use the available tools, over the long term and on a regular 
basis, without encountering reputational, operational, and 
other risks. 
A. Purchase and Redemption Fees: Overview & 
Challenges 
Since 2005, mutual funds can impose a redemption fee, no 
greater than two percent of the redemption amount, in certain 
situations.276 A fund retains the redemption fee in order to 
recoup costs related to the shareholder redemption.277  
Purchase and redemption fees present alternative anti-di-
lution and cost-shifting devices for mutual funds. The fees, 
perceived as “simpler” for investors to understand, face inves-
tors’ unfavorable perceptions and operational challenges.278 
Mutual funds currently impose redemption fees in limited sce-
narios such as to “combat ‘market timing’ as part of ‘frequent 
trading policies.’”279 Further, disclosure and use of a purchase 
or redemption fee by a fund often discourages shareholder in-
vestment.280 Mutual fund industry representatives perceive 
redemption fees as an impediment to both marketing efforts 
and having intermediaries offer the fund on its investment 
 
276 Swing Pricing Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 62327. 
277 See SEC, Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26782, 70 FR 13328. 13341 (Mar. 18, 2005). The redemption fee 
may be no more than two percent of the value of the shares redeemed. 17 
C.F.R. § 270.22c–2(a)(1)(i). Rule 22c–2 requires that each fund’s board of 
directors (including a majority of independent directors) either (i) approve 
a redemption fee that in its judgment is necessary or appropriate to recoup 
costs the fund may incur as a result of redemptions, or to otherwise elimi-
nate or reduce dilution of the fund’s outstanding securities, or (ii) determine 
that imposition of a redemption fee is not necessary or appropriate. Id. 
278 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62370. See also Final 
Rules, supra note 4, at 82126 (distinguishing redemption fees and alterna-
tives from swing pricing). Purchase and redemption fees might also avoid 
fees that would avoid the NAV volatility and tracking error that they predict 
will occur with swing pricing. 
279 BlackRock Comment Letter, supra note 189, at 4. 
280 Id. 
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menu to clients.281 The existence of the tool, but lack of de-
ployment to combat liquidity and dilution concerns, mitigates 
its viability as a robust alternative to swing pricing. 
One author challenges the SEC’s claim that swing pricing 
would be simpler to implement over redemption fees because 
swing pricing can be implemented through changes to the 
fund’s policies and procedures, whereas redemption fees re-
quire changes to the intermediaries’ systems.282 Not calcu-
lated into the SEC’s position is the important role intermedi-
aries play in making swing pricing possible.283 If 
intermediaries agree to significant changes in trading cut-off 
times, they will necessarily be required to implement such 
changes within their systems, as well as undertake the ardu-
ous and unpleasant task of communicating the significant 
changes to their clients who purchase funds through their 
platforms. 
B. In-Kind Redemptions: Overview & Challenges  
Many funds reserve the right to utilize in-kind redemp-
tions to facilitate the need for liquidity as a result of a signifi-
cant redemption or other extraordinary circumstances.284 A 
fund may send a pro-rata portion of its own portfolio securities 
to a redeeming shareholder instead of cash proceeds in a time 
of extraordinary circumstances as a way to mitigate liquidity 
costs to remaining shareholders.285 The fund must not favor 
 
281 Holly van den Toorn observed in her role in the mutual fund indus-
try that redemption fees are viewed unfavorably by intermediaries and 
shareholders. 
282 See Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 627–29 (discuss-
ing implementation barriers). 
283 See infra Section IV.B.1.a. 
284 Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82087 (discussing in-kind redemp-
tions). 
285 Definitions; Applicability; Rulemaking Considerations, 15 U.S.C. § 
80a-2 (“‘Redeemable security’ means any security, other than short-term 
paper, under the terms of which the holder, upon its presentation to the 
issuer or to a person designated by the issuer, is entitled . . . to receive ap-
proximately his proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets, or the 
cash equivalent thereof.”). 
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one shareholder over another by sending U.S. Treasuries, 
which are perceived as stable and safe investments, while it 
sends riskier investments to another shareholder.286 A fund 
must send a pro-rata portion of its redeemable portfolio secu-
rities to eligible investors when it does so.287 While it is un-
common to process in-kind redemptions,288 it can be done 
when a fund and its remaining shareholders would be harmed 
significantly if it sold securities at steep discounts because of 
market volatility or stress.  
Alternatively, funds can use redemptions in-kind as a 
method of tax management. If a fund holds securities that 
have significantly appreciated since purchase, selling the se-
curity would cause the fund to incur a realized capital gain.289 
Annually, realized capitals gains distributions are made to 
fund shareholders after being off-set by any capital losses the 
fund realized during the year.290 Capital gains distributions 
are taxable income to shareholders, and particularly in a tax-
advantaged fund, routine capital gains distributions would be 
problematic for the fund as well as for shareholders.291 
 
286 Holly van den Toorn raises the cherry-picking scenarios as a possi-
bility and notes the importance of policies and procedures to protect the pro 
rata portion of each security. 
287 See Kenneth C. Fang, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 3601654 
(Dec. 21, 2005) (GE Institutional Funds requests, and the SEC provides, no-
action relief where GE proposes in-kind procedures including pro-rata dis-
tribution). This no-action letter is guidance for other mutual funds imple-
menting similar in-kind transaction procedures. 
288 The use of in-kind redemption is considered uncommon, but in 
truth, there is little transparency into the process. It is difficult to track this 
tool’s usage because in-kind redemptions are typically processed through 
the NSCC with all other trading, also making it difficult to process due to 
high volumes of regular market trades processing at the same time. Thus, 
it is difficult to estimate the depth of this particular market practice. 
289 Karen Domato, ‘Redemptions in Kind’ Become Effective for Tax 
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No tax event occurs to either party when a fund distributes 
portfolio securities to a shareholder.292 This is vitally im-
portant to funds and shareholders who redeem large portions 
of a fund. In times of market duress, however, these potential 
tax benefits are eroded by the fact that the portfolio securities 
are trading at deeply discounted prices and funds are more 
likely to capture a capital loss than a gain.  
Large investors may think twice before making large re-
demptions, or a run on a fund, if they can expect to receive 
securities in-kind rather than cash. In-kind redemption may 
encourage fund stability by discouraging exit. Redemptions 
in-kind can dampen the “first mover advantage” and reduce 
the likelihood that multiple large shareholders would all want 
to exit a fund in times of market stress—i.e., when the fund 
NAV is low. 
Redemptions in-kind are commonplace for Exchange 
Traded Funds (“ETFs”), but not for mutual funds because of 
logistical challenges, shareholders’ unwillingness to accept 
other stock in lieu of cash at the point of exiting the fund, and 
other issues.293 Mutual funds typically utilize in-kind redemp-
tions as a “last resort or emergency measure,” and a fund’s 
management personnel would be under strained capacity to 
deal with significant redemptions, possible runs on the fund, 
and other stressful situations.294  
Reliance on in-kind redemptions poses reputational risks 
for a mutual fund, where the investment benefits from the 
easy diversification and conversion to cash for investors. His-
torically, hedge funds have been more frequent users of this 
redemption distribution method, but it is typically a “sign of 
catastrophic liquidity problems” and associated with more 
locked-in capital.295 In addition to the liquidity challenge for 
 
292 Id. 
293 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62319–20. See also 
Final Rules, supra note 4, at 82087 (discussing in-kind redemptions). 
294 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62320. 
295 Domato, supra note 289. See also, e.g., Managed Funds, Comment 
Letter on Swing Pricing (Jan. 13, 2016), at 2–3, https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-16-15/s71615-83.pdf [perma.cc/6E37-5A8U] (citing to existing li-
quidity management tools for private hedge funds such as redemption 
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mutual fund shareholders receiving in-kind redemptions, an-
other disadvantage is that they could receive “odd lots” of se-
curities. 296 Odd lots, an atypical amount of stock under the 
standard 100-share unit,297 may be difficult to sell at the price 
at which the entire lot was carried by the fund.298 This is par-
ticularly the case in the fixed income market, where minimum 
delivery sizes exist, and odd lots of bonds are traded at re-
duced prices because of the difficulty in subsequently selling 
the small lots of bonds to another investor.299 A shareholder 
may refuse to take the in-kind securities for this reason.300 
C. A Considered Alternative: Dual Pricing 
U.S. mutual funds cannot engage in dual pricing, some-
times referred to as ask/bid dual pricing, although it is avail-
able in European jurisdictions.301 Dual pricing allocates inves-
tor expenses and protects against dilution. Unlike in-kind 
redemptions and redemption fees, the SEC has considered but 
never authorized dual pricing.302 A dual-priced fund is one 
 
rights, lock up periods, advance notice requirements of redemptions, early 
redemption fees, side pockets, gates, and in-kind redemptions.). 
296 Holly van den Toorn made this observation in her role in the mutual 
fund industry. 
297 POZEN, supra note 25, at 266. 
298 Holly van den Toorn made this observation in her role in the mutual 
fund industry. 
299 Holly van den Toorn made this observation in her role in the mutual 
fund industry. 
300 See e.g., Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62319 (dis-
cussing in-kind redemptions). Holly van den Toorn experienced a situation 
in which a shareholder essentially refused to take an in-kind redemption 
due to the operational complexities. Smaller funds may face negotiation dis-
advantages in “forcing” the redemption and end up stuck between a rock 
and regulatory hard place. Ultimately, the fund with which she worked 
abandoned the in-kind redemption strategy, sold assets, and recorded the 
tax impact. 
301 Dual pricing is applied predominantly to UCITs and AIFs in other 
jurisdictions. Holly van den Toorn made this observation in her role in the 
mutual fund industry. 
302 In its rule proposal release, the SEC considered permitting dual 
pricing instead of swing pricing. Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, 
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that “calculates one price for subscribers, derived from under-
lying security offer prices and another price for redeemers, de-
rived from underlying security bid prices and in each case, po-
tentially the related market costs.”303  
Dual pricing conveys transaction costs to the transacting 
shareholders by publishing a “bid” NAV at which the fund is 
purchased and an “ask” NAV at which the fund is sold on a 
business day.304 A “crossing” method matches purchases and 
sales while portfolio securities are traded and related costs are 
then borne by the purchasing and selling shareholders via the 
NAV.305 Thus, two NAVs are published—a bid NAV for pur-
chasing shareholders and an ask NAV for redeeming share-
holders—spreading the transactional costs to shareholders 
who precipitate the need for trading portfolio securities. 
UCITS and alternative investments funds (“AIFs”) sold in 
markets outside of the United States primarily utilize dual 
pricing.306 The SEC considered but rejected dual pricing in fa-
vor of swing pricing, citing concerns about operational chal-
lenges to implement the system as well as investor compre-
hension and comfort.307 
While dual pricing may effectively externalize transactions 
costs, U.S. mutual funds have no current authority, or opera-
tional capacity, to engage in dual pricing. The different mu-
tual fund market timing—when the trading day closes and the 
time funds have to process orders while striking the NAV—
between the U.S. and European markets complicates swing 
pricing, as discussed above, and complicates dual pricing as 
well. 308 The criticisms of blind swinging apply with equal 
 
at 62329. Note that ALFI does not specify whether it refers to a dual priced 
mutual fund, UCIT, or AIF. 
303 ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 7. 
304 Id. at 9. 
305 Id. 
306 BLACKROCK, VIEWPOINT: FUND STRUCTURES AS SYSTEMIC RISK MITI-
GANTS 6 (2014). 
307 The SEC “believe[d] [swing pricing] would be simpler to implement 
and for investors to understand.” Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 
4, at 62329. 
308 See discussion supra Section III.B. 
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force to dual pricing.309 The SEC, aware of the dual pricing 
alternative, rejected it in favor of swing pricing as a simpler 
and easier-to-understand option. 310 In addition, ALFI notes 
that dilution can still occur in a dual priced fund if the bid/of-
fer NAVs are not a full reflection of the underlying costs of the 
investment or divestment.311  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article concludes by noting both authors’ shared ob-
servations and bringing to bear their individual experiences 
and professional expertise to analyze the value and viability 
of the swing pricing rule and its components.  
First, both authors acknowledge that the swing pricing 
rules signal a significant departure in mutual fund regulation. 
The limited application (and use) of the existing liquidity and 
dilution tools outlined in Part V demonstrate the low industry 
and regulatory priority previously placed on liquidity and di-
lution management. Swing pricing, on the other hand, is a tool 
that with operational changes could be used consistently by 
many U.S. mutual funds. Second, and most notably, swing 
pricing authorizes funds to alter the NAV—the single most 
definitive feature of open-ended funds in the United States. 
This is a technical, but radical, change to mutual fund regula-
tion. 
Market data and operational timing conflicts are the big-
gest barriers to successful swing pricing implementation. How 
can funds estimate the swing threshold trigger and subse-
quent NAV adjustment by the swing factor before they receive 
complete trading data? Significant industry practices, espe-
cially with regard to intermediaries servicing retirement ac-
counts, will need procedural adjustments, possibly along with 
 
309 A fund would publish its NAV before it could fully assess the impact 
of shareholder purchases and redemptions and apply adjustments to calcu-
late the separate bid and ask NAVs. 
310 Swing Pricing First Proposal, supra note 4, at 62329; see also Final 
Rules, supra note 4, at 82087 (citing to in-kind redemption comments). 
311 ALFI 2015 SURVEY, supra note 58, at 8. 
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the financial incentives, to do so. Complete and reliable mar-
ket data are prerequisites to implementing swing pricing with 
any degree of confidence, accuracy or efficiency, especially in 
light of the absence of a safe harbor for participating funds. 
Blockchain technology offering automated, verified, and se-
cure ledger maintenance is one promising avenue.312 
The voluntary nature of the swing pricing rules compounds 
the necessity of systemic industry change. The SEC provided 
the opportunity to swing the NAV, but not the path. It seems 
clear to both authors that the SEC is using the voluntary as-
pect of the rules to allow the first adopters to pave the way. 
First adopters are likely to be large firms with European 
funds in their complex and experience with the practice, who 
also have in-house transfer agents with proprietary systems, 
budgets, and the teams needed to undertake the expensive 
proposition. For example, large market players are the early 
experimenters in blockchain stock ledgers.313 Large firms pre-
sumably have greater clout and more leverage with interme-
diaries than smaller firms do. This Article refers to this as the 
Wal-Mart effect, and it seems apt. Intermediaries must be 
willing to make significant changes to trade cut-off times and 
operational systems if any early adopter can effectively swing 
the NAV. Leaving the implementation path up to the mutual 
fund industry links regulatory success to financial incentives. 
The industry can solve the operational challenges, but only if 
it is lucrative to do so. Financial incentives may be found in 
blockchain technology advances that reduce, if not eliminate, 
the need for operational staff and inter-institutional verifica-
tion of stock ledgers. Cost savings are inherent in collapsing 
the mutual funds and retirement financial services system. 
Which parties benefit from the savings—funds, investors, 
plan servicers, etc.—remains to be seen.  
Relevant for all mutual funds, the SEC telegraphed its con-
cerns regarding liquidity management and dilution preven-
tion as regulatory priorities with the new rules. With the 
 
312 See supra notes 227–248 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
blockchain. 
313 See e.g., Irrera, supra note 238 (discussing Nasdaq blockchain tech-
nology for mutual funds). 
TUCKER_VANDENTOORN_FINAL  
200 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
swing pricing rules, the SEC sends a clear message that funds 
and fund boards should be considering how to address poten-
tial dilution to shareholders’ investments. Funds should take 
the SEC’s message as a prompt to assess their current anti-
dilution tools, practices, and related policies and procedures 
to determine whether they are sufficient in light of not only 
historical flows and potential emergency situations, but also 
the SEC’s current concerns regarding fund liquidity.  
An Industry Perspective on Swing Pricing 
My primary perspective is that of an active industry par-
ticipant, responding to regulatory pronouncements and 
change.314 The Liquidity Management Program Rules—of 
which swing pricing is a component—impose new require-
ments for funds to digest and implement. The mutual fund 
industry also faces the much-anticipated, now-delayed DOL 
Fiduciary Rule. January 2018 is the designated compliance 
date, however an executive order by President Trump and a 
subsequent appeal by the Department of Labor have ushered 
in uncertainty and confusion around the fiduciary duty 
rule.315 While federal law is being figured out, Nevada passed 
 
314 This Subsection was written by Holly van den Toorn, who has over 
eighteen years of mutual fund industry experience and is currently a Legal 
and Compliance Manager for a publically traded company, its wholly-owned 
registered investment advisors, and affiliated mutual funds. 
315 Memorandum on the Fiduciary Duty Rule, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 95 (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2017/02/03/presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule [perma.cc/ 
DL2X-68YH]. The Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Fiduciary Rule’s compli-
ance date was reset to January 1, 2018, but President Trump signed an Ex-
ecutive Memorandum compelling the DOL to review the Fiduciary Rule “to 
determine whether it may adversely affect the ability of Americans to gain 
access to retirement information and financial advice.” Id. The DOL subse-
quently filed a brief in a lawsuit, stating it had proposed to the Office of 
Management and Budget (“OMB”) to delay the compliance date to July 1, 
2019. Brief for Respondents at 1, Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Acosta, 
2017 WL 5135552 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2017) (No. 16-03289). The DOL offi-
cially began the eighteen-month delay in the November 29, 2017 Federal 
Register publication. 18-Month Extension of Transition Period and Delay of 
Applicability Dates; Best Interest Contract Exemption (PTE 2016-01); Class 
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its own version of a bill introducing a new fiduciary stand-
ard.316  
With several significant rules imposing new compliance 
obligations over the next two years,317 fund complexes and ad-
visors must do more with less. Many in the industry are not 
feeling confident about meeting these obligations in the near-
term. Legal and compliance teams are already stretched thin 
implementing report modernization, liquidity risk manage-
ment programs, new liquidity policies and procedures, in ad-
dition to addressing the industry disruptions resulting from 
DOL’s new definition of who is a fiduciary. And this is before 
tackling swing pricing. 
In response to these regulatory changes, the industry ex-
pects significant consolidation among money managers 
through time-consuming mergers and acquisitions.318 The 
mutual fund industry initially balked at the idea that any 
fund could be prepared to opt into swing pricing—a procedural 
undertaking of epic proportions. And that’s before we begin to 
comprehend the operational complexities and ponder the fea-
sibility of swing pricing. Perhaps the industry is not at odds 
with the requirements of swing pricing, but the landscape for 
the requirements.  
As discussed above, significant changes to the structure of 
intermediaries receiving and forwarding trades to funds is 
needed in order to implement swing pricing. Two factors may 
 
Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between Invest-
ment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs (PTE 2016-
02); Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 for Certain Transactions In-
volving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance 
Companies, and Investment Company Principal Underwriters (PTE 84-24), 
82 Fed. Reg. 56545 (Nov. 29, 2017) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
316 See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 628A.010 (2017). 
317 See discussion supra note 4. In fact, the ICI recently submitted a 
request to the new SEC Commissioner to consider delaying the compliance 
date by an additional year. Memorandum from ICI to ICI Members (July 
20, 2017) (on file with the authors). 
318 Grace Jennings-Edquist, Complicated Fee, Sales Environment Cre-
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increase swing pricing adoptions, particularly among fund 
managers who do not currently utilize swing pricing in Euro-
pean jurisdictions. First, increased flexibility in setting the 
swing threshold—such as is the practice in Europe—may al-
low for customized threshold calculations taking into account 
additional NAV elements such as market impact, bid-ask 
spread and excluding transaction taxes. Second, the SEC 
should issue additional guidance before November 2018 for 
participating funds on the threshold calculations, preferred 
operational procedures, and safe harbors.  
If industry operations can adjust to accommodate the tim-
ing and information needs of swing pricing, it may enjoy fu-
ture success in the United States. Two related incentives 
should give mutual funds sufficient reason to implement 
swing pricing: purported enhancements to a fund’s reported 
performance and mitigated asset dilution from unallocated 
transaction costs. But the optional proposal is an expensive 
way to tackle dilution at a time when demands on industry 
resources are significant.  
Once the compliance dust settles enough for investment 
advisers to have a clear view of the regulatory horizon, indus-
try attention will turn to this optional opportunity. Portfolio 
managers like the idea of swing pricing for its performance 
enhancing properties, and legal and compliance departments 
like swing pricing for its shareholder protections despite the 
complexities of setting the factor and threshold. Transfer 
agents and back office administrators, however, see a looming 
headache with compliance, and possible elimination with au-
tomating technologies.  
Blockchain could be in important tool for funds, and could 
not only reform some antiquated operational systems, but also 
provide an operational solution to enable funds’ implementa-
tion of swing pricing with a measure of confidence in its accu-
racy. While transfer agents as we know them could dissolve, 
opportunities exist for transfer agents to build the path for 
blockchain becoming an industry-wide standard for pro-
cessing shareholder transactions. Mutual funds could see re-
duced expenses with smaller back-office staffing needed as a 
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result of full implementation of blockchain, and begin to re-
turn value to shareholders with swing pricing as well. While 
this is a time of great upheaval, it also presents as opportunity 
for the mutual fund industry and its shareholders.  
Certainly, the SEC expects funds to bulk up anti-dilution 
toolboxes. Each shareholder bears the burden of liquidity 
management under the current reality. Alternatives exist to 
manage liquidity and dilution, but they are weak or impracti-
cal to be used on a consistent, on-going basis. Large firms, in-
cluding those that service mutual funds, will be the early 
adopters of swing pricing. Undoubtedly, a united industry 
front will smooth the way, as long as funds work with service 
providers and intermediaries.  
Swing pricing will be an opportunity for early adopters. 
Participating funds will see an uptick in fund performance. 
Fund inflows (new investors) follow positive performance. 
More importantly, sedentary shareholders will be protected 
from long-term dilution, which will build shareholder trust 
and confidence in funds that choose to adopt the practice. The 
SEC has offered a tool that could serve as a conciliatory olive 
branch to beleaguered shareholders, many of whom are retire-
ment investors hit hard during the recent financial crisis.   
An Academic Perspective on Swing Pricing 
My prior research engages with retirement investors,319 
making my perspective “bottom up” looking at individuals 
populating the plans and the consequences of dilution. A brief 
primer on how retirement investors enter the markets is in 
order.320 Compensation (i.e., employer matching funds), tax 
incentives to invest, tax penalties to withdraw, and structural 
 
319 See e.g., Tucker, supra note 65 (describing locked in retirement in-
vestors); Anne M. Tucker, The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders & 
Corporate Alienation, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 99 (2014) (describing the legal 
rights and restrictions on retirement investors in the traditional corporate 
governance framework); Anne M. Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmiti-
gated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUSTON L. REV. 153 
(2013) (describing the legal changes to the retirement experiment). 
320 This Subsection was written by Anne M. Tucker, Associate Profes-
sor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. 
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incentives such as automatic enrollment strongly influence 
the “choice” to invest.321 Retirement investors entering the 
mutual fund market through defined contribution plans and 
individual retirement accounts fueled rapid growth of the in-
dustry.322 The mutual fund industry now manages $16.3 tril-
lion assets and manages retirement investments for 54.9 mil-
lion U.S. households.323 Once invested, retirement investors 
face exit obstacles that make their investments sticky. In 
other words, they are more likely to be sedentary, staying in 
a fund for a long time, and recent ICI retirement investor re-
search demonstrates this.324 
The shifted focus in retirement planning away from pen-
sions to self-directed defined contributions plans (i.e., 401Ks) 
has been described as the great experiment. In the United 
States, retiring employees are no longer guaranteed an in-
come325 in retirement, but instead are guaranteed access to 
the assets that they saved and now manage. Robert Merton 
described the U.S. retirement experiment in the following col-
orful terms: 
[I]t’s a real stretch to ask people to acquire sufficient 
financial expertise to manage all the investment steps 
needed to get to their pension goals. That’s a challenge 
even for professionals. You’d no more require employ-
ees to make those kinds of decisions than an au-
tomaker would dump a pile of car parts and a tech-
nical manual in the buyer’s driveway with a note that 
 
321 See Tucker, supra note 65, at 168–69. 
322 INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 130; see also Holden, supra note 3, 
at 2 (describing defined contribution plan asset trends from 2007–2016). 
323 ICI FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 10; see also Holden, supra note 3, at 
2. 
324 See Holden, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
325 Pensions were never universal and the headline-making failure of 
steel companies and pensions in the 1970s contributed to the shift to indi-
vidual savings vehicles. Retirement Revolution, supra note 319, at 163–167. 
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says, ‘Here’s what you need to put the car together. If 
it doesn’t work, that’s your problem.’326 
In this experiment, to extend the analogy, there are many 
uncontrolled variables such as how much people save, how 
well they invest it, and how long they live that make retire-
ment policy and market regulation complex and indefinite. 
Transaction cost dilution, however, is a controllable variable. 
The U.S. retirement experiment needs every available tool in 
its arsenal to promote individual and systemic financial sta-
bility. The SEC’s swing pricing rules present a path for funds 
to control at least this one variable. 
As my co-author ably describes, the SEC’s path is partial, 
incomplete, and fraught with operational challenges that are 
significant, scary, and will require individuals within the mu-
tual fund industry to spend tedious hours solving. No one 
wants to do this, and no one wants to ask their colleagues to 
do this. European funds’ robust experience with swing pricing 
should be a salve to U.S. mutual fund industry concerns. Eu-
ropean market timing differences aside, it is evidence of a 
workable and profitable system. Some U.S. funds have opera-
tions in Europe and therefore have experience with these is-
sues.  
The voluntary nature of the SEC rules and the costs asso-
ciated with operational changes to accommodate swing pric-
ing practices means that large firms will be the swing pricing 
pioneers. Large firms will lead the way, and enhanced fund 
performance (returns without an offset for large transaction 
costs) should lure in others. The SEC’s voluntary approach ap-
pears calculated to leverage the best of market influences—
money incentives and competition—to make the necessary 
 
326 Robert C. Merton, The Crisis in Retirement Planning, HARV. BUS. 
REV., July–Aug. 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-crisis-in-retirement-plan-
ning [perma.cc/6GZS-WCLQ]. Robert Merton’s bio describes him as a recip-
ient of the 1997 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and a 
School of Management Distinguished Professor of Finance at MIT Sloan 
School of Management. He is also the resident scientist at Dimensional 
Fund Advisors, a Texas-based global asset management firm, and Univer-
sity Professor Emeritus at Harvard University. 
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structural changes to timing and reporting practices to facili-
tate swing pricing. 
Another word about operations before concluding with a 
focus on retirement investors: Structural impediments to 
swing pricing such as incomplete information, trading trans-
actions bleeding into the evening hours, and the role of inter-
mediaries reflect an industry that has outgrown its original 
procedural capacity and intent. Swing pricing has not caused 
the procedural impediments highlighted in this Article; rather 
the new practice merely highlights these existing ailments. 
Swing pricing illustrates the ad hoc and piecemeal develop-
ment of industry practices and procedures needed to accom-
modate rapid growth and fundamental changes to the inves-
tor landscape from individual investors to retirement 
investors through qualified plans. Operational changes to ac-
commodate swing pricing may better reflect the size and in-
vestor makeup of the mutual fund industry. Perhaps the re-
sulting procedural changes will be an improvement for mutual 
funds resulting in practices better tailored to serve the current 
reality of who invests in mutual funds and how they enter the 
markets. Private blockchains between transacting institu-
tions offer a promising solution for the timing and liability 
hurdles we carefully explored above. Perhaps even more ex-
citing for those with an eye out for retirement investors is the 
potential cost savings from operational reduction in mutual 
fund transactions promised by blockchain technology. 
Finally, a last word about retirement investors. Retire-
ment policy, tax incentives, and defined contribution plan at-
tributes funnel retirement investors to mutual funds and 
make it difficult for them to leave. A market design that di-
lutes sedentary shareholder assets due to unallocated trans-
action costs generated by large trades (and presumably large 
shareholders) erodes that trust, jeopardizes individual finan-
cial stability, and, to be unacademic, is unfair. 
On This We Can Agree 
The SEC’s swing pricing rules present a half solution to 
shareholder dilution and create more implementation prob-
lems than the rules solve. Funds must volunteer to assume 
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the regulatory and operational challenges presented by the 
rules. Perhaps this is by design. A partial administrative ap-
proach requires a market-led solution born of mutual fund in-
dustry and intermediary participation and buy in. For an in-
dustry symbolized by a bull327 and which has brought 
financial innovation and savings capacity to the masses, 
swing pricing obstacles are not insurmountable. Mutual funds 
have powerful incentives—financial gain and competition 
with other funds—to confront the challenges ahead. With the 
advent of blockchain technology, mutual funds now have pow-
erful tools to overcome operational challenges and modernize 
transactions practices, regardless of whether funds imple-






















327 For a discussion of the Wall Street bull, or charging bull, see CHARG-
ING BULL, http://chargingbull.com/chargingbull.html [perma.cc/G8LL-
P7BM]. 
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APPENDIX 
Federal Legislation & Agency Rules Referenced in Article 
Federal Legislation 
The 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a  
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a  
The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-51  
See § 80a-2 for a definition of “value” of securities 
See § 80a-16 for discussion of board of directors’ election & duties 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-20 
SEC Rules 
Mutual Fund Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1 
Net Asset Value Calculations, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4, 2a-7, 18f-3d 
Money Market Funds, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 
Pricing and Redeeming Shares 
Board of Directors written procedures 
Reporting Obligations, 17 C.F.R. § 270.8b-5 
Rule 22 
Pricing regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c 
Market timing, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-2 
Swing pricing, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 
Liquidity Risk Management Programs, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e–4 
Compliance Procedures & Fund Board of Directors, 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 
Other Agency Rules 
IRS Required Distributions 26 § C.F.R. 1.401(a)(9)-1 
DOL Fiduciary Duty, 29 § C.F.R. 2510.3-1 
